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Whenever I’m about to do something, I think “would an idiot do that?” 
And if they would, I do not do that thing. 
 —Dwight K Schrute 
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Abstract 
The Communicable Diseases Branch (CDB) of Queensland Health has the role 
of protecting the health of Queenslanders through the monitoring, surveillance, 
and control of communicable diseases. From February 2016 to December 2017, 
I undertook a field placement within the CDB. This thesis details projects 
undertaken during this 22-month field placement. The projects comprise an 
investigation of a Q fever outbreak at an animal refuge clinic and veterinary 
clinic, the establishment of a surveillance system to identify newly acquired 
hepatitis C infections in Queensland, an analysis of vaccine breakthrough 
invasive pneumococcal disease in Queensland in children younger than 5 years 
of age, and an analysis of the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland. Also described in this thesis are other public health experiences 
gained during my placement, including my role in teaching, an assessment of 
the need to include rheumatic heart disease as a notifiable condition in 
Queensland, a WHO Western Pacific Regional Office consultancy, and a 
lookback investigation of a dental clinic. Together, these projects and 
experiences fulfil the core requirements of the Master of Philosophy (Applied 
Epidemiology) program at Australian National University. 
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summary of experience 
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Field placement overview 
My placement for the duration of the MAE program was at the Communicable 
Diseases Branch (CDB) within the Prevention Division of Queensland Health, 
located in Brisbane. Three units exist within the CDB: Blood Borne Viruses and 
Sexually Transmissible Infections, Communicable Diseases and Infection 
Management, and Epidemiology and Research. 
 
The main responsibilities of the CDB include: 
• protecting the public health of Queenslanders from communicable diseases; 
• overseeing legislation, policy, and operational management related to 
communicable diseases; 
• developing advice and guidelines for preventing communicable diseases 
spreading from person to person and from animals to people; 
• coordinating Queensland’s immunisation program; 
• monitoring and coordinating the response to disease outbreaks attributed to 
communicable diseases; 
• planning for and responding to emerging pandemics and biosecurity threats; 
and 
• surveillance of notifiable conditions. 
 
The public health system in Queensland operates as a decentralised system, 
with 13 public health units (PHUs) across the state. PHUs are responsible for 
the public health management of notifiable conditions within their respective 
jurisdictions. 
 
My primary role was within the Epidemiology and Research unit, but worked 
with other units as required by the projects I was undertaking. From October 
2016 to February 2017, I worked one day per week as an honorary public health 
registrar at Metro South Public Health Unit in Brisbane. 
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Summary of degree requirements 
Investigate an acute public health event 
While spending time as an honorary public health registrar at Metro South 
Public Health Unit in Brisbane, I investigated an outbreak of Q fever at an 
animal refuge and veterinary clinic in southeast Queensland (Chapter II). As 
part of this investigation, I interviewed cases and developed a self-administered 
questionnaire that was used to conduct a retrospective cohort study among 
workers at the animal refuge and veterinary clinic. We found that the outbreak 
was most likely due to exposure to an infected parturient cat that gave birth to a 
litter at the animal refuge, all of which were subsequently euthanised by 
veterinary clinic staff. As a result of our findings, we wrote a letter to the 
Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) recommending 
that occupational groups regularly exposed to parturient products of cats or 
dogs be recommended to receive Q fever vaccine and that this recommendation 
be included in the Australian Immunisation Handbook. 
 
Establish a public health surveillance system 
I established a surveillance system to identify newly acquired hepatitis C 
infections in Queensland (Chapter III). Prior to this project, Queensland was the 
only state not to identify or report newly acquired hepatitis C infections to the 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). The surveillance 
system I established uses data linkage to match new notifications of hepatitis C 
with previous negative anti-hepatitis C antibody test results. Following 
implementation of this system, Queensland now reports the highest number of 
newly acquired hepatitis C infections Australia-wide. In addition to the data 
linkage process, I implemented an enhanced surveillance pathway to collect 
information on reasons for testing and risk factors for hepatitis C virus (HCV) 
acquisition from diagnosing clinicians of newly acquired cases. I also developed 
and implemented criteria for further follow-up of cases without identified risk 
factors for HCV acquisition by the relevant PHUs.  
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Analyse a public health data set 
The National Immunisation Program (NIP) currently funds a 3-dose primary 
course (3+0) of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine at 2, 4, and 6 months 
of age. I performed descriptive analysis of vaccine breakthrough invasive 
pneumococcal disease (IPD) cases in Queensland following the introduction of 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccines (Chapter IV). I found that there has been an 
increase in the number of breakthrough IPD cases, the majority of which have 
been identified as serogroup 19A. Breakthrough cases of IPD occurred at a 
median age of 23 months, approximately 15 months after the final dose in the 
primary course, suggesting the potential benefit of a booster dose schedule. 
ATAGI has recently proposed a change to the pneumococcal vaccination 
schedule to include primary doses at 2 and 4 months of age, with a booster dose 
at 12 months. 
 
Plan and conduct an epidemiological study 
Individuals with medical conditions at elevated risk of invasive pneumococcal 
disease are recommended to receive pneumococcal vaccination in the Australian 
Immunisation Handbook. However, those with a previous episode of IPD are 
not included in the current Handbook recommendations, despite overseas 
evidence that they are at increased risk of future episodes. I planned and 
performed the analysis of a Queensland dataset of invasive pneumococcal 
disease notifications. to estimate the risk of recurrent IPD in Queensland 
(Chapter IV). This was achieved using time-to-event analysis and Cox 
Proportional Hazards modelling. We found that after an initial case of IPD, 
individuals experience future episodes at 35 times the rate of the general 
population. The risk of recurrence is even higher among Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people. As a result of our findings, we wrote to ATAGI 
recommending that a previous episode of IPD be included in the high-risk 
group of the Australian Immunisation Handbook, and be recommended to 
receive appropriate pneumococcal vaccination. We have recently received notice 
that this recommendation will be included in an updated version of the 
Pneumococcal disease chapter in the Handbook. 
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Prepare a scientific manuscript for a peer-reviewed journal 
I prepared the following manuscript: 
• An outbreak of Q fever associated with parturient cat exposure at an animal 
refuge and veterinary clinic in southeast Queensland (Chapter II), accepted 
for publication in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 
 
Communication to a lay audience 
I wrote a one-page summary titled “Workplace Q Fever Outbreak Investigation 
Summary” to communicate the findings of the outbreak investigation to staff 
members of the workplaces where the outbreak occurred (Chapter II). 
 
Conference presentations 
I gave the following oral presentations at scientific conferences: 
• Breakthrough cases of invasive pneumococcal disease in Queensland 
children following the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, 
2000–2015. Australian Epidemiological Association 23rd Annual Scientific 
Meeting, Canberra, Australia, 14–16 September 2016 
• Estimating the risk of recurrent pneumococcal disease—Queensland, 
Australia, 2001–2015. 8th Southeast Asia and Western Pacific Bi-Regional 
TEPHINET conference, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 28 November–02 December 
2016  
• Estimating the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland, 1997–2015. 15th World Congress on Public Health, Melbourne, 
Australia, 03–07 April 2017 
• Using data linkage to identify newly acquired hepatitis C infections in 
Queensland. Communicable Diseases Control Conference 2017, Melbourne, 
Australia, 26-28 June 2017 
• An outbreak of Q fever associated with domestic animal exposure at an 
animal refuge in southeast Queensland. Communicable Diseases Control 
Conference 2017, Melbourne, Australia, 26–28 June 2017 
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Lessons from the field 
I prepared a teaching exercise titled “Tips and tricks for working with multiple 
records per subject in Stata” (Chapter V). I also attended Lessons from the Field 
exercises, prepared by fellow MAE scholars. 
 
Teaching 
I participated in the following teaching activities (Chapter V): 
• Teaching during a session of the Outbreak Investigation subject for first-year 
MAE scholars 
• Co-chairing a teaching session with fellow MAE scholar, Rose Wright, for the 
Issues in Applied Epidemiology subject, which focused on building social 
connection and trust among first-year MAE scholars 
 
Coursework 
I passed the following coursework subjects of the MAE Program: 
• POPH8316—Outbreak Investigation 
• POPH8317—Public Health Surveillance 
• POPH8315—Research Design and Methods 
• POPH8315—Analysis of Public Health Data 
• POPH8914—Issues in Applied Epidemiology 
 
Awards 
I won the following awards for oral presentations related to my epidemiology 
study on estimating the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland: 
• Queensland regional Australasian Faculty of Public Health Medicine Gerry 
Murphy prize, 2016 
• First prize, 8th Southeast Asia and Western Pacific Bi-Regional TEPHINET 
conference, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 2016 
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Additional field placement activities and other roles 
In addition to activities related to the core requirements of the MAE Program, I 
also took part in the following projects and activities, and held additional roles 
during my placement (Chapter VI): 
 
• Honorary public health registrar at Metro South Public Health Unit 
• Weekly CDB notification meetings 
• OzFoodNet Outbreak Control Team meetings and Multi-jurisdictional 
Outbreak Investigation teleconferences 
• Expert Advisory Group member for a lookback investigation of a dental 
practice with infection control breaches 
• An assessment of the need and suitability of rheumatic heart disease as a 
notifiable condition in Queensland; and 
• World Health Organization Western Pacific Regional Office consultant 
epidemiologist for the “TB-Free Ebeye” project on the island of Ebeye, 
Republic of the Marshall Islands. 
 
Summary of MAE requirements 
A summary of my projects and activities, and how they meet the core MAE 
requirements, is provided in the table below. 
 
Table—Summary of MAE projects and the fulfilment of core competencies and course 
requirements 
  Chapter  
 Degree requirements II III IV V  
 Outbreak investigation ■  ■   
 Establish a surveillance system  ■ ■   
 Data analysis   ■   
 Epidemiological study   ■   
 Teaching activities    ■  
 Conference presentation ■ ■ ■   
 Communication with a lay 
audience 
■     
 Late draft of a peer review 
publication 
■     
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Prologue 
This chapter describes the investigation of a Q fever outbreak at an animal 
refuge and veterinary clinic in southeast Queensland, from October to 
December 2016. The first case in the cluster was identified following the 
laboratory notification of Q fever in an animal refuge worker, who was 
hospitalised as a result of their infection in late-November 2016. Routine follow-
up by Metro South Public Health Unit (MSPHU) revealed that additional animal 
refuge workers, and two staff members at an adjacent veterinary clinic, had 
reported having a non-specific febrile illness. An outbreak investigation was 
initiated after the second laboratory notification of Q fever in another animal 
refuge worker, one week after the first case was notified. The body of this 
chapter is the manuscript submitted to a scientific journal that summarises the 
outbreak investigation and its findings. 
 
Project role 
Commencing in late-October 2016, I spent one day a week at MSPHU as an 
honorary public health registrar to gain experience in the management and 
control of communicable diseases at an operational level. As part of this work, I 
led the epidemiological investigation of this outbreak and shared 
responsibilities with other public health unit staff for the initial interviewing of 
cases. I also followed up pathology results, gathered information from animal 
refuge and veterinary clinic management, and reviewed animal and euthanasia 
records. I developed a self-administered questionnaire to be completed by staff 
members in order to conduct a retrospective cohort study as part of the 
outbreak investigation (Appendix A), and entered and analysed the data. I wrote 
a one-page summary of the investigation findings to provide to the staff at the 
animal refuge and veterinary clinic (Appendix B) and have summarised the 
investigation findings in a manuscript which has been submitted to the 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health (accepted for 
publication).  
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Lessons learned 
This was my first experience in leading an outbreak investigation and in 
developing a questionnaire for a study. Through interviewing cases and staff at 
the veterinary clinic, I was able to gain additional descriptive information that 
was useful in determining a plausible source of transmission. In developing, 
revising, and reviewing responses to the self-administered questionnaire, I 
gained valuable experience in the careful wording of questions to reduce the 
likelihood of misinterpretation by staff completing the questionnaire. In the 
design of the study, I collected information regarding the Q fever vaccination 
status of staff, allowing me to conduct a sensitivity analysis to avoid 
misclassification of asymptomatic cases and exclude those with pre-existing 
immunity. I felt this was a valuable practical learning point in study design and 
minimising potential sources of bias. 
 
Public health impact 
Q fever, caused by the intracellular bacterium Coxiella Burnetii, is a vaccine-
preventable disease that can result in severe illness and long-term sequelae. 
Appropriate infection control practices and provision of Q fever vaccine are 
essential in reducing its burden among those at highest risk of disease. 
Traditionally, high-risk occupations include those where individuals are 
routinely exposed to cattle, sheep, and goats, such as abattoir workers. This 
investigation found that the outbreak was most likely due to a parturient cat 
that gave birth to a litter in an animal refuge, highlighting the risk of Q fever in 
non-livestock-related occupations. 
 
Following notification of confirmed cases at the animal refuge and veterinary 
clinic, staff from Workplace Health & Safety Queensland (WHSQ) performed a 
site visit and reviewed infection control practices at the animal refuge centre. 
Animal refuge and veterinary clinic staff members subsequently underwent 
voluntary pre-vaccination screening and were offered Q fever vaccine if negative 
results were received to both screening tests. 
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A manuscript detailing this outbreak investigation has been accepted for 
publication in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. The 
manuscript highlights the need for clinicians to be aware of exposure to 
parturient cats and dogs as a risk factor for Q fever, and recommends that 
occupational groups with regular exposure to parturient cats or dogs receive Q 
fever vaccine. I also wrote a letter to the Australian Technical Advisory Group 
on Immunisation (ATAGI) recommending that animal refuge workers be added 
to the list of recommended occupations to receive Q fever vaccine in the Q fever 
chapter of the Australian Immunisation Handbook (Appendix C). 
 
Communication 
• An outbreak of Q fever associated with domestic animal exposure at an 
animal refuge in southeast Queensland. Communicable Diseases Control 
Conference 2017, Melbourne, Australia, 26–28 June 2017 
• Outbreak investigation summary provided to workplace (Appendix B) 
• Letter to ATAGI (Appendix C) 
 
MAE core activity requirements addressed 
• Investigation of an acute public health event 
• Peer-review publication 
• Communication to a lay audience 
• Presentation at a national conference 
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Abstract 
Background: To determine the source of a human Q fever outbreak at an 
animal refuge and veterinary clinic in southeast Queensland from October to 
December 2016. 
 
Methods: Case interviews and a retrospective cohort study of animal refuge and 
veterinary clinic staff using a self-administered questionnaire related to clinical 
history of Q fever, Q fever vaccination status, and workplace activities during 
the exposure period. 
 
Results: Seven cases (six confirmed, one probable) were identified. Forty-three 
questionnaires were completed (91% response rate). Workplace activities 
associated with the greatest risk of illness were disposal of deceased cats or dogs 
(RR, 14.0; 95% CI, 1.9–104.1) and participating in euthanasia of cats or dogs 
(RR, 4.6; 95% CI, 1.3–16.9). Five feline birthing events occurred at the animal 
refuge from 25 September–19 October 2016, each with subsequent euthanasia 
of the queen cat and litter. All cases had likely exposure to a specific queen cat 
and her litter that were euthanised the same day as the birthing event. 
 
Conclusions: A parturient cat was the most likely source of the outbreak. 
Occupational groups and others with regular exposure to feline or canine 
parturient products should receive Q fever vaccine. 
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Introduction 
Q (query) fever is caused by the intracellular bacterium Coxiella burnetii and 
was first described among Queensland abattoir workers in 1937.1 Transmission 
occurs through inhalation of C. burnetii-contaminated aerosols, usually 
generated from parturient products or slaughtering of infected animals.2 As C. 
burnetii can survive in the environment for prolonged periods, infection can 
occur in those without direct animal contact.2 The most commonly identified 
reservoirs are cattle, sheep, and goats.2,3 Human outbreaks and cases are 
therefore generally reported in abattoir workers or those with livestock 
exposure,1,2,4,5 though many cases have clear no risk factors for transmission 
identified.5-7 In Australia, Q fever vaccine (Q-Vax, CSL Limited) is 
recommended for abattoir workers and other high-risk groups.8 Q fever vaccine 
has demonstrated a signification reduction in the risk of developing Q fever in 
occupationally exposed populations, with a vaccine effectiveness of 
approximately 92% in a recent systematic review and meta-analysis.9 
 
Serological evidence of C. burnetii infection has also been found in cats, dogs, 
kangaroos, flying foxes, bandicoots, and ticks.2,4,10 Human outbreaks have been 
associated with exposure to both infected parturient cats11-16 and dogs.17 
Australian estimates of C. burnetii seroprevalence range from 0–7.8% in 
cats10,18 and 1.9–21.8% in dogs.10,19,20 Despite moderate C. burnetii 
seropositivity in Australian feline and canine populations, reports of local 
human Q fever cases attributed to cat or dog exposures are exceedingly rare. 
The only documented feline-associated Q fever outbreak in Australia reported 
nine cases after a caesarean section was performed on an infected cat at a small 
animal veterinary clinic near Sydney in 2011.15 A combination of the high 
proportion of asymptomatic Q fever infections2 and low index of clinical 
suspicion in patients without a history of livestock exposure could lead to cat- 
and dog-related human Q fever being an unrecognised phenomenon in 
Australia. 
 
On 17 November 2016, Metro South Public Health Unit (MSPHU) in Brisbane 
received laboratory notification of Q fever in an animal refuge worker. Routine 
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follow-up by MSPHU staff revealed that the case had been hospitalised and 
other animal refuge employees were experiencing non-specific febrile illnesses, 
including two staff members at an adjacent veterinary clinic. An outbreak 
investigation was initiated after laboratory confirmed infection in a second 
animal refuge worker. Our investigation focused on the most likely sources of 
infection—livestock, cats, and dogs.  
 
Methods 
Outbreak setting 
The animal refuge had a livestock area that routinely kept sheep, goats, geese, 
ducks, and kangaroos. Dogs and cats were kept in separate impounds that were 
not accessible to the public. The veterinary clinic was adjacent (but not 
connected) to the animal refuge, and not in close proximity to the livestock area. 
Veterinary clinic staff regularly attended the animal refuge to perform 
euthanasia of cats and dogs. 
 
Case definitions and exposure period 
Confirmed and probable case definitions were developed (Box). The incubation 
period for C. burnetii (4 days14 to 6 weeks) was used to define a likely common 
exposure period for cases.2 
 
Case-finding 
Animal refuge and veterinary clinic staff who were unwell prior to or during the 
investigation were encouraged to contact MSPHU and request their usual 
medical practitioner perform testing for Q fever. All cases of Q fever notified to 
MSPHU during the outbreak investigation (who were not employees of the 
animal refuge or veterinary clinic) were asked if they had visited an animal 
refuge in southeast Queensland during their exposure period. Neighbouring 
public health units were alerted to the outbreak and requested to also determine 
if new Q fever cases had visited an animal refuge. 
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Box—Case definitions used during a Q fever outbreak at an animal refuge and 
veterinary clinic in southeast Queensland, 2016 
 Confirmed case  
 From 15 September to 31 December 2016, any animal refuge or veterinary clinic staff with either: 
1. Detection of C. burnetii through nucleic acid testing 
OR 
2. Presence of IgM antibodies to C. burnetii AND a clinically compatible illness. 
 
 Probable case  
 From 15 September to 31 December 2016, any animal refuge or veterinary clinic staff with: 
1. A clinically compatible illness (e.g. fever, influenza-like illness, pneumonia, hepatitis) 
AND 
2. No previous clinical history of Q fever 
AND 
3. No previous record of receiving Q fever vaccine. 
 
   
 
Case interviews 
All confirmed and probable cases were interviewed using the standard 
Queensland Health Q fever Case Report Form21 and dates of work were 
ascertained for the common exposure period. 
 
Animal records 
Records of livestock present at the animal refuge from mid-September until the 
onset date of the earliest case were reviewed. Euthanasia records for cats, 
kittens, and dogs at the animal refuge for the same time period were also 
examined to explore the potential likelihood of transmission events. Euthanasia 
records included dates of birth for kittens born at the animal refuge and 
veterinary staff who performed the euthanasia. 
 
Site visit 
MSPHU staff alerted Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (WHSQ) of the 
outbreak. WHSQ subsequently performed a site visit of the animal refuge in 
late-November 2016. 
 
Employees of the animal refuge and veterinary clinic were offered Q fever pre-
vaccination screening (intradermal hypersensitivity test and serum 
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complement-fixation antibody test). Q fever vaccine was offered to those with 
negative results to both screening tests. 
 
Self-administered questionnaire 
We conducted a retrospective cohort study among animal refuge and veterinary 
clinic staff to determine workplace activities associated with Q fever infection. A 
paper-based, self-administered questionnaire with questions related to clinical 
history of Q fever, Q fever vaccination status, and workplace activities from 15 
September to 31 October 2016 was developed. The questionnaire was delivered 
to animal refuge and veterinary clinic management for distribution among staff 
members (including cases) and was collected one week later. Due to the non-
specific nature of clinical Q fever and the high proportion of asymptomatic 
infections, questions related to symptoms were not included in the 
questionnaire to assist with case finding. 
 
Data analysis 
Individuals who reported receiving Q fever vaccine more than six weeks prior to 
the onset of the first case were deemed to be at low risk of infection9 and were 
excluded from analysis. Risk ratios were calculated, comparing cases and non-
cases, for visiting the livestock area, cat impound, dog impound, and for specific 
workplace activities within these areas. Individuals who reported not visiting 
the livestock area, cat impound, or dog impound were excluded from further 
analysis of workplace activities specific to that area. Fisher’s exact p-values were 
calculated for corresponding risk ratios, with p<0.05 considered significant. For 
exposures with a risk ratio of infinity, exact logistic regression was used to 
calculate an odds ratio and the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Individuals who underwent Q fever pre-vaccination screening after the 
investigation commenced, and reported receiving the vaccine negative screening 
results, were classified as susceptible non-cases. To control for the potential 
misclassification of asymptomatic cases or inclusion of individuals with pre-
existing immunity, a sensitivity analysis was performed comparing exposures of 
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cases to susceptible non-cases. All analyses were performed using Stata 14.1 
(Stata Corp, USA). 
 
Ethics approval 
This investigation was carried out under the powers in the Queensland Public 
Health Act 2005 in response to an acute threat to public health in order to 
determine the likely source of disease transmission and potential ongoing risk 
to staff and the public. Ethics approval was therefore not required. 
 
Results 
Cases 
Seven cases (six confirmed, one probable) were identified among 47 staff 
members (15% attack rate), with illness onset dates from 21 October to 20 
November 2016 (Figure 1). Two confirmed cases had C. burnetii detected 
through nucleic acid testing. The probable case had a non-specific febrile illness 
with elevated inflammatory markers, elevated liver enzymes, no previous 
clinical history of Q fever, and no record of receiving Q fever vaccine. 
Confirmatory testing was unable to be performed for the probable case. Two 
(29%) cases were hospitalised as a result of their illness (Case 1, for five days; 
Case 4, for two days). The common exposure period was from 09 to 17 October 
(Figure 2). No visits to an animal refuge were reported among notified cases of 
Q fever in southeast Queensland (who were not animal refuge or veterinary 
clinic staff) during the investigation. 
 
Case interviews 
Five cases (83%) were animal refuge workers with varying roles including 
management, cleaning of animal areas, and disposal of deceased animals after 
euthanasia. Case 1 handled cats and kittens during euthanasia and also attended 
to laundry at the veterinary clinic. Multiple staff reported that personal 
protective equipment (PPE) was not routinely used in the handling of animals 
or newborn kittens during euthanasia. 
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Figure 1— Timeline of Q fever outbreak at an animal refuge and veterinary 
clinic in southeast Queensland, 2016. *The probable case (case 6) was not 
notified and came to attention through follow-up of other notified cases. 
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Animal records 
Veterinary clinic staff attended the livestock area in mid-September to review an 
unwell, 3-month-old goat. The goat was kept at the animal refuge for less than 
one week before being transferred for adoption and was unavailable for Q fever 
testing. No livestock births occurred during the common exposure period and 
livestock slaughtering did not occur at the animal refuge. 
 
From 25 September to 19 October, there were records of five feline birthing 
events at the cat impound where the queen cats and their litters were eventually 
euthanised by veterinary clinic staff. A birthing event on 07 October—when all 
cases were present at work—involved a cat that had been caught in a trap by the 
local council on 05 October. This cat delivered her litter prematurely and they 
were all subsequently handled and euthanised the same day. As a common 
exposure, this event equates to maximum incubation periods of 14 and 44 days 
for Cases 1 and 7, respectively. The four other occasions where a queen cat and 
her litter were euthanised occurred on days when either all cases were not 
present at work, euthanasia was not performed on the same day as the birthing 
event, euthanasia was performed by a susceptible non-case, or the 
corresponding incubation periods fell outside the known range. The origin of 
these four queen cats was not ascertained during the investigation. There were 
no reports of euthanised puppies in the records reviewed. Animal cadavers were 
collected and disposed of on a weekly basis and were therefore unavailable for 
testing. 
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Figure 2—Exposure periods for cases of Q fever (confirmed and probable) 
during an outbreak at an animal refuge and veterinary clinic in southeast 
Queensland, 2016 
 
Self-administered questionnaire 
Forty-three (91% response rate) questionnaires were completed by workers 
(both cases and non-cases) at the animal refuge (38) and veterinary clinic (5). 
Three animal refuge workers reported receiving Q fever vaccine more than 6 
weeks prior to the onset date of Case 1 and were excluded from the analysis. All 
cases reported attending each of the livestock area, cat impound, and dog 
impound between 15 September and 31 October. 
 
Activities associated with the greatest risk of illness were disposal of deceased 
dogs or puppies, disposal of deceased cats or kittens, providing or assisting with 
euthanasia of dogs, and providing or assisting with euthanasia of cats or kittens 
(Table). After aggregating dog- and cat-related activities, disposal of deceased 
animals (RR, 14.0; 95% CI, 1.9–104.1, p=0.001) and providing or assisting with 
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the euthanasia of animals (RR, 4.6; 95% CI, 1.3–16.9, p=0.03) remained the 
activities associated with highest risk of illness. 
 
Twenty individuals reported receiving Q fever vaccine after commencement of 
the investigation. The sensitivity analysis, including only susceptible non-cases 
(n=20) and all cases, demonstrated a similar pattern of risk ratios reported in 
the Table (Appendix D). However, the exposures with the highest associated 
risk, disposal of deceased dogs or puppies (RR, 4.2; 95% CI, 1.0–17.2, p=0.06) 
and disposal of deceased cats or kittens (RR, 3.6; 95% CI, 0.9–14.6, p=0.07), 
were no longer statistically significant. 
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Discussion 
We found descriptive and epidemiological evidence that this outbreak of Q fever 
was likely caused by exposure to parturient products of an infected cat. The 
most plausible source was the queen cat that delivered her litter prematurely on 
07 October, all of which were subsequently euthanised the same day. C. burnetii 
has been detected in cats having an abortion or delivering stillbirths, and 
associated with prematurity and abortion in other animals.22 If this was a point-
source outbreak, the range of incubation periods was 14–44 days. The upper 
limit of this range is similar to the previously reported extreme,23 although 
environmental contamination with delayed transmission is also possible. Case 1, 
with the earliest onset of illness, was likely to have had the highest exposure 
dose to infectious material through assisting with euthanasia of cats and 
attending to laundry at the veterinary clinic—consistent with the dose-
dependent incubation period of acute Q fever infection1,24 and known 
transmission routes.12  
 
The origin of the implicated queen cat (from a council trap) is of potential 
interest, as feline subpopulations are likely to differ in their potential for 
acquiring C. burnetii infection. Of two previous Australian C. burnetii 
seroprevalence studies, one found the highest seropositivity among cattery-
confined cats, with zero seropositivity in feral and shelter cats,18 while the other 
examined urine samples from domesticated cats at a veterinary surgery.10 The 
seroprevalence of C. burnetii among shelter and feral cats in Australia is 
therefore unknown, and requires further investigation to determine the risk of 
human Q fever infection from this source. 
 
While six of the seven cases reported having direct contact with livestock, the 
absence of livestock birthing events, slaughtering, and corresponding risk ratios 
for livestock-related activities makes this an unlikely source of disease 
transmission. Disposal of deceased dogs or puppies and assisting with the 
euthanasia of dogs were associated with an increased risk of illness. However, 
only one case reported exposure to dogs giving birth during the exposure period, 
making this an unlikely mode of infection. For most cases, cat- and dog-related 
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activities were correlated, providing an explanation for the significant 
association with some dog-related activities in the absence of a high-risk 
exposure event for Q fever in the dog impound. The lack of other plausible 
sources of transmission supports our conclusion that this outbreak was due to 
an infected parturient cat. 
 
Outbreaks of Q fever associated with parturient cats have been reported in the 
United States,13 Canada,11,12,16 and Australia.15 Our outbreak was detected 
following the hospitalisation, Q fever testing, and subsequent laboratory 
notification of two cases. This outbreak likely would have gone undetected had 
these two cases developed a milder clinical illness not requiring hospitalisation. 
A history of exposure to parturient domestic animals should serve as an 
indication for Q fever testing in patients with an unexplained, non-specific 
febrile illness. 
 
Q fever vaccination for all veterinarians, veterinary nurses, and veterinary 
students, and the use of PPE during exposure to parturient products was 
recommended in the first (2011)25 and two subsequent (2013, 2017)26,27 editions 
of the Australian Veterinary Association Guidelines for Veterinary Personal 
Biosecurity. Surprisingly, none of the veterinary clinic staff and only three 
animal refuge workers had previously received Q fever vaccine. Additionally, 
PPE was not reported as being used by animal refuge or veterinary clinic 
workers involved with euthanasia, even when exposed to parturient products. 
These practices are consistent with previous reports demonstrating a relatively 
low perceived risk of Q fever among Australian veterinary workers28 and cat 
breeders.29 Additionally, The Australian Immunisation Handbook recommends 
Q fever vaccine for professional dog and cat breeders,8 though other 
occupations with exposure to parturient cats and dogs are not currently 
included in this recommendation. Given our finding that feline birthing events 
were a relatively common occurrence in the cat impound, workers in these 
settings are likely to experience a similar exposure risk to that of professional 
dog and cat breeders. Animal refuge workers and others with regular exposure 
to parturient cats or dogs should therefore also be included in the 
recommendation to receive Q fever vaccine after undergoing pre-vaccination 
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screening. Ongoing communication from Workplace Health and Safety, State 
Departments of Health, and the Australian Veterinary Association regarding the 
risk of Q fever infection—reinforcing the use of PPE and Q fever vaccination—
should be provided to those in the veterinary and non-veterinary workforces 
with routine exposure to parturient cats or dogs. Promoting the use of PPE as 
part of routine infection control practices in veterinary and non-veterinary 
workforces is also of importance, given the potential for infection with other 
zoonoses. 
 
Our investigation was limited by the lack of Q fever serological testing for all 
workers at the animal refuge and veterinary clinic, resulting in potentially 
misclassifying asymptomatic cases and including non-cases with pre-existing 
immunity. We also did not include questions related to symptoms of Q fever in 
the self-administered questionnaire, which may have assisted in identifying 
additional cases that would benefit from Q fever serology. There is potential for 
differential misclassification of unidentified cases as non-ill in the primary 
analysis of the cohort. However, sensitivity analyses, including only the cohort 
who underwent Q fever pre-vaccination screening and subsequently received Q 
fever vaccination as susceptible non-cases, revealed a similar pattern of risk 
ratios for workplace exposures when compared to the primary analysis. As this 
investigation was undertaken as part of an acute public health response in a 
busy metropolitan public health unit, a more comprehensive approach involving 
serum sampling of all at-risk staff was not feasible.  
 
We were also limited by the inability to test for markers of C. burnetii infection 
in the implicated cat, as was performed during the previous Australian cat-
related outbreak.15 This testing would have provided additional evidence to 
either support or refute our conclusions. 
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Conclusions 
Our outbreak investigation highlights that parturient cats and dogs are 
potentially unrecognised sources of sporadic Q fever cases and outbreaks in 
Australia. A history of exposure to feline or canine parturient products should 
increase clinical suspicion for Q fever in patients with an unexplained, non-
specific febrile illness. Q fever vaccine should be provided to susceptible 
individuals with occupational or other regular exposure to parturient cats or 
dogs. 
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Appendix A—Work-related activities questionnaire 
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Appendix B—Outbreak investigation summary 
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Appendix C—Letter to ATAGI 
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Appendix D—Supplementary Table 
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Prologue 
In Australia, infection with the hepatitis C virus is a nationally notifiable disease 
in the ‘Blood-borne viruses and sexually transmitted infections’ group. 
Notifications of hepatitis C are classified as either ‘unspecified’ or ‘newly 
acquired’. For notifications to be classified as newly acquired, cases are required 
to have evidence of one of the following: a negative anti-hepatitis C antibody test 
within the preceding 24 months, detection of anti-hepatitis C antibody in a child 
aged 18 to 24 months, or detection of hepatitis C virus by nucleic acid testing in 
a child aged 3 to 24 months. Alternatively, cases may also be classified as newly 
acquired if they have had a clinical presentation consistent with acute hepatitis 
(jaundice, bilirubinuria, or alanine transaminase more than 10 times the normal 
limit) within the previous 24 months, where other causes of acute hepatitis have 
been excluded. 
 
At the commencement of my placement, Queensland was the only state that did 
not identify or report newly acquired cases of hepatitis C to the National 
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), with all notifications classified 
as unspecified. Newly acquired hepatitis C was also the only nationally 
notifiable disease not reported by Queensland. The lack of reporting of newly 
acquired cases represented a risk to both those responsible for communicable 
disease control and reporting, and to public health unit staff, as there was an 
inability to detect clustering of newly acquired cases and monitor trends in 
community transmission. 
 
Project role 
I worked within the Epidemiology and Research unit to develop a process for 
identification of newly acquired hepatitis C infections using data linkage to 
match new notifications of hepatitis C with previous negative anti-hepatitis C 
virus antibody test results. I also developed enhanced surveillance processes for 
subsequent follow-up of certain cases by the diagnosing clinician and relevant 
public health unit staff. The first phase of the project that I was involved in 
included requesting a change to the Queensland Notifiable Conditions System to 
allow recording of newly acquired hepatitis C infections, as this was not 
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previously a disease classification available in the system. I then developed the 
Stata code to identify cases that had a previous negative anti-hepatitis C 
antibody test in the public pathology laboratory data. I subsequently developed 
and piloted a surveillance form to send to diagnosing clinicians to collect 
information related to reasons for testing and known risk factors for hepatitis C 
acquisition. Using the information gathered from previous hepatitis C test 
results and the diagnosing clinician surveillance form, I developed criteria for 
the follow-up of cases by the relevant public health unit. I also modified the 
existing enhanced surveillance case report form to align with the enhanced 
surveillance fields collected for national reporting. 
 
Lessons learned 
This project was the most rewarding for me to complete while also being the 
most challenging. I enjoyed the process of reasoning how the system might work 
and exploring potential methods that could be implemented. I soon realised I 
could not develop a perfect system due to constraints with receiving identifying 
information from private pathology laboratories. My approach then focused on 
the resources that were available within the Communicable Diseases Branch in 
order to implement a system that was both feasible and sustainable. The 
technical aspects of the surveillance system were most interesting to me, but the 
process of engaging with public health physicians and general practitioners for 
feedback was likely most useful for my own experience. While engaging 
stakeholders in such projects is extremely important, it can also be very difficult 
to receive feedback from those with many other responsibilities and priorities. 
In this regard, having a ‘buy-in’ from stakeholders to recognise the importance 
of the work you are doing is essential. This will be a lesson I take forward with 
me in my career in public health and epidemiology. 
 
Public health impacts 
The establishment of this surveillance system has resulted in the following 
potential impacts: 
• Risk factor data are now routinely collected and reported for identified cases 
0f newly acquired hepatitis C. These surveillance data may be used to 
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monitor and evaluate public health interventions related to control of 
hepatitis C 
• Implementation of routine follow-up of newly acquired cases of hepatitis C 
infection where injecting drug use and imprisonment have not been 
identified as risk factors for transmission. This aspect of the system has the 
potential to identify threats to public health, allowing for prevention of 
further disease transmission 
 
Communications 
This project resulted in the following communications and dissemination of 
findings: 
• Royal Australasian College of General Practitioners newsletter 
communication to members regarding the commencement of enhanced 
follow-up of newly acquired cases of hepatitis C 
• Presentation at Queensland public health physicians’ face-to-face meetings, 
October 2016 and June 2017 
• Presentation at a Queensland public health nurses face-to-face meeting, 
June 2017 
• Oral presentation at Public Health Association of Australia 23rd 
Communicable Disease Control Conference, Melbourne, 28 June 2017 
 
Core activity requirements 
This project meets the following core MAE activity requirements: 
• Establish or evaluate a disease surveillance system 
• Presentation at a national scientific conference 
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Abstract 
Background: Infection with hepatitis C virus is a nationally notifiable condition 
in Australia. Cases with either laboratory or clinical evidence of their infection 
being acquired within the previous 24 months are classified as newly acquired 
infections, while all other cases are classified as unspecified. Prior to 2016, 
Queensland was the only state not to identify or report newly acquired hepatitis 
C infections. The primary objectives of this project were to establish a 
surveillance system to identify and follow-up newly acquired hepatitis C 
infections in Queensland. 
 
Methods: I established a surveillance system that used data linkage to match 
previous public laboratory negative anti-hepatitis C antibody test results with 
new notifications of hepatitis C. The data linkage process was performed 
retrospectively for hepatitis C notifications from 2011 to 2016, and was 
integrated into the Queensland weekly notification process in January 2017. I 
also developed an enhanced surveillance process for cases identified as newly 
acquired infections who were not imprisoned at the time of their diagnosis or 
within the previous 24 months. For these cases, a surveillance form was sent to 
the diagnosing clinician to collect information regarding reasons for testing and 
risk factors for acquisition. Where newly acquired infections did not have 
imprisonment or injecting drug use identified as risk factors, further follow-up 
by local public health units occurred to assess possible routes of transmission 
and the presence of any ongoing threat to public health. 
 
Results: From 2011 to 2016, a total of 14,975 hepatitis C cases were notified to 
the Queensland State Department of Health, of which 1,740 (12%) were 
identified as newly acquired infections. As part of weekly notification activities, 
the data linkage process took approximately 30 minutes to complete. In the first 
half of 2017, 62 diagnosing clinician forms were distributed, of which 46 (79% 
response rate) were returned. Six cases of newly acquired infection did not have 
imprisonment or injecting drug use identified as risk factors by the diagnosing 
clinician and required further follow-up by the staff from their local public 
health unit. After PHU follow-up, all of these cases were assessed to have likely 
acquired their infections through IDU. 
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Conclusions: Data linkage provided an efficient and sustainable process to 
identify newly acquired hepatitis C infections. Legislative changes that provide 
access to private laboratory negative test results would improve case 
ascertainment and the overall usefulness of the system. 
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Introduction 
Infection with hepatitis C virus (HCV) is a major cause of chronic liver disease 
worldwide. In Australia, over 200,000 people are living with chronic hepatitis C 
infection, with an estimated 47,000 residing in Queensland.1 Transmission of 
HCV most commonly occurs through contact with infected blood products, 
usually as a result of injecting drug use (IDU).2 Historically, the majority of 
individuals who become infected with HCV developed chronic hepatitis C, while 
approximately one-quarter of individuals spontaneously clear the virus.3 
However, new treatments options—publicly subsidised for all people living with 
hepatitis C in Australia—clear the infection in 79–95% of cases, varying 
according to the infecting HCV genotype and treatment regimen.4 However, as 
only 10–30% of acute HCV infections are symptomatic, most commonly with 
fever, jaundice, abdominal pain, fatigue, myalgia, dark urine, nausea, vomiting, 
or loss of appetite,5,6 diagnosis and treatment are often delayed. 
 
Cases of hepatitis C that have recently acquired their infection provide the 
opportunity to ascertain the most likely mode of transmission, enabling the 
monitoring of recent trends in risk factors for acquisition of HCV. Accurate and 
timely information regarding those with newly acquired HCV infections also 
allows for the identification of priority groups for public health interventions 
and treatment. The availability and funding of highly curative treatments has 
raised the possibility of HCV elimination, increasing the importance of HCV 
surveillance activities. While most cases acquire their infections as a result of 
IDU practices, non-IDU-related transmission does occur.7-9 Identification and 
follow-up of incident hepatitis C infections can potentially detect cases or 
clusters of non-IDU-related HCV transmission, enabling a public health 
response. 
 
Hepatitis C surveillance in Australia 
Hepatitis C is a nationally notifiable disease in Australia, with all states and 
territories reporting cases to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance 
System (NNDSS). Cases are classified as either ‘unspecified’ or ‘newly acquired.’ 
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The Communicable Diseases Network Australia (CDNA) national case definition 
for newly acquired hepatitis C is presented in Box 1.10 All confirmed hepatitis C 
notifications that do not meet the newly acquired case definition are classified 
as unspecified. National reporting fields for enhanced surveillance of newly 
acquired hepatitis C cases include reasons for testing and identified risk factors 
for HCV transmission (Appendix A). 
 
Box 1—Communicable Disease Network Australia national case definition for hepatitis 
C (newly acquired)10 
 Reporting  
 Only confirmed cases should be notified.  
 Confirmed case  
 A confirmed case requires either: 
1. Laboratory definitive evidence 
     OR 
2. Laboratory suggestive evidence AND clinical evidence. 
 
 Laboratory definitive evidence  
 1. Detection of anti-hepatitis C antibody from a person who has had a negative anti-hepatitis C 
antibody test recorded within the past 24 months 
     OR 
2. Detection of hepatitis C virus by nucleic acid testing from a person who has a negative anti-
hepatitis C antibody test result currently, or has had, within the past 24 months 
     OR 
3. Detection of anti-hepatitis C antibody from a child aged 18 months to 24 months 
     OR 
4. Detection of hepatitis C virus by nucleic acid testing in a child aged 3 months to 24 months. 
 
 Laboratory suggestive evidence  
 Detection of anti-hepatitis C antibody, or hepatitis C virus by nucleic acid testing in a patient with no 
prior evidence of hepatitis C infection. 
 
 Clinical evidence  
 Clinical hepatitis within the past 24 months (where other causes of acute hepatitis have been 
excluded) defined as: 
1. Jaundice 
     OR 
2. Bilirubin in urine 
     OR 
3. Alanine transaminase (ALT) ten times the upper limit of normal. 
 
   
 
Queensland 
In Queensland, cases of hepatitis C are notified by pathology laboratories to the 
Queensland State Department of Health. Hepatitis C is listed as a ‘pathological 
diagnosis notifiable condition’ and ‘controlled notifiable condition’ in the Public 
Health Regulation 2005.11 Under the Public Health Act 2005,12 pathology 
laboratories must notify the Department of Health when examination of a 
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specimen indicates the patient has a pathological diagnosis of a notifiable 
condition. For controlled notifiable conditions, the Act provides additional 
regulatory powers, such as chief executive’s orders or detention orders, to stop 
the transmission of the condition to other persons.  
 
Prior to 2016, Queensland did not have a surveillance system to identify or 
report cases of newly acquired hepatitis C to the NNDSS, with all notifications of 
hepatitis C classified as unspecified. Enhanced surveillance and follow-up of 
newly acquired hepatitis C infections therefore also did not occur during this 
period. From 2011-2015, Queensland reported an average of 2,200 unspecified 
hepatitis C notifications annually, the second highest case-burden of all states 
and territories after New South Wales. Due to the high number of hepatitis C 
notifications received, manual review of the testing history for each notification 
was not a feasible method to identify newly acquired infections. Additionally, 
there is no legislative requirement for clinicians to notify the Department of 
Health upon diagnosing HCV infection. 
 
A large proportion of medical laboratory testing in Queensland is performed by 
the state public pathology laboratory, Pathology Queensland. Pathology 
Queensland provides pathology services to all Queensland public hospitals, 
prisons, and certain community health services (e.g. alcohol and drug services, 
sexual health clinics). Healthcare professionals working in public hospitals, 
public health units (PHUs), and the Department of Health are able to access 
Pathology Queensland test results through the state-wide electronic pathology 
results software program (AUSLAB). Two private pathology laboratories, 
Sullivan Nicolaides Pathology and Queensland Medical Pathology, also perform 
a considerable portion of the medical laboratory testing within the state, and are 
used largely by general practitioners and private healthcare providers.  
 
As a decentralised health system, PHUs are responsible for the follow-up and 
enhanced surveillance of notifiable diseases within their respective jurisdictions, 
with 13 PHUs operating in 16 Hospital and Health Services across the state. 
However, due to the high case numbers and absence of a system to identify 
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newly acquired infections, notifications of hepatitis C are not routinely followed-
up by PHUs. 
 
Other states and territories 
In other Australian jurisdictions, identification of newly acquired cases is 
performed through a combination of accessing previous pathology laboratory 
testing data, obtaining case information from diagnosing clinicians, and follow-
up of certain cases according to their age, as part of enhanced surveillance. 
Previous efforts in Australia to improve hepatitis C surveillance have identified 
between 1-8% of notifications as newly acquired, after appropriate follow-up.2,13-
18 
 
In Victoria, the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 requires diagnosing 
medical practitioners to notify the Victorian Department of Health & Human 
Services (DHHS) of notifiable conditions.19 For hepatitis C, diagnosing medical 
practitioners are required to complete a written notification of hepatitis C to 
DHHS within five days of diagnosis.20 The hepatitis C notification form contains 
information regarding classification of hepatitis C (i.e. newly acquired or 
unspecified), patient details and demographics, risk factors, and reasons for 
testing. Follow-up of notifications occurs in cases identified as newly acquired, 
aged 30 years or younger, healthcare workers, where the doctor’s notification 
raise public health concerns, and in those with no identified high-risk exposures 
other than having undergone skin penetrating procedures (e.g. tattooing, body 
piercing). 
 
In Western Australia, the public pathology laboratory (PathWest) notifies the 
Department of Health if a patient has had a negative anti-HCV antibody test 
within two years of the notifying test result. PathWest services correctional 
centres in WA and therefore a large number of newly acquired cases are 
identified from the prison population. Additionally, enhanced surveillance is 
performed on a random sample of 30% of the unspecified cases. 
 
In the Northern Territory, enhanced surveillance forms are faxed to diagnosing 
clinicians of hepatitis C cases who have not previously been notified. The 
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information provided by the diagnosing clinician is used to determine if cases 
meet the newly acquired case definition. Further investigation is performed for 
all newly acquired infections to determine the most likely source of infection 
and whether any further public health action is required. 
 
Challenges with hepatitis C surveillance 
There are inherent challenges related to the identification and surveillance of 
newly acquired hepatitis C infections. As 70 to 90% of acute infections are 
asymptomatic, only a small proportion of cases will be diagnosed during the 
acute phase of illness (i.e. when symptoms might be most likely to be apparent), 
when accurate ascertainment of risk factors and attribution of disease 
acquisition routes could be successful. As a result, chronic HCV infections may 
go undiagnosed and untreated for considerable periods of time. Additionally, in 
instances when cases develop acute hepatitis and are subsequently diagnosed 
with HCV infection, identifying these people as having a newly acquired 
infection may not occur due to the lack of legislative requirements for clinicians 
to provide this information to the relevant PHU or State Department of Health. 
 
Due to resource limitations, accessing previous negative hepatitis C test results, 
in particular those performed at private pathology laboratories or interstate, is 
not always possible or feasible for PHU or CDB staff. Where multiple pathology 
laboratories operate, patients may often undergo testing through different 
laboratories and results may not be readily accessible to PHU staff responsible 
for enhanced surveillance and follow-up. For laboratory tests by Pathology 
Queensland, individuals are assigned different unique person identifiers for 
each hospital, health clinic, or correctional centre they attend, further 
complicating the process of manually searching individual testing history. 
Furthermore, due to the potential stigmatisation of HCV infection, names of 
patients are frequently anonymity coded in testing documentation. Most 
commonly, these anonymity codes consist of the first two letters of the patient’s 
first and last names, or a combination thereof. This further complicates the 
matching of new notifications with previous HCV test results. 
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Finally, a case definition requiring evidence of seroconversion necessitates that 
individuals have previously been tested for HCV in the past 24 months, which is 
unlikely to occur in the general population. Groups who are routinely screened 
for HCV, such as people who inject drugs (PWID) and those who are 
imprisoned, are therefore the most likely to be identified by this case definition. 
Individuals who acquire HCV and who do not inject drugs are less likely to have 
undergone previous HCV screening, and are therefore less likely to be identified 
as a newly acquired infection in the absence of acute hepatitis. Such cases are 
important to identify through the process of enhanced surveillance as their 
mode of HCV acquisition is more likely to represent a risk to the public (such as 
a healthcare acquired infection), requiring further investigation and public 
health actions. 
 
Aim and objectives 
The aim of this project was to create an efficient and sustainable system for the 
identification and follow-up of newly acquired hepatitis C infections in 
Queensland. 
 
The key objectives of the surveillance system and project were to: 
• identify cases of newly acquired hepatitis C infection for state and national 
reporting, both retrospectively to establish baseline trends, and 
prospectively as part of weekly notifications reporting. 
• compare the demographics of notifications identified as newly acquired 
hepatitis C infections with those that remained classified as unspecified. 
• compare the number, rates, and proportion of total hepatitis C notifications 
identified as newly acquired with other states and territories. 
• establish a process where reasons for testing and risk factors for HCV 
transmission are collected for newly acquired infections. 
• prioritise cases of newly acquired hepatitis C infections for enhanced 
surveillance and follow-up by PHUs. 
• conduct an informal evaluation of the established system to ensure long-
term sustainability. 
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Methods 
Scoping and overview of system development 
The absence of a pre-existing hepatitis C surveillance system necessitated the 
development of a system to operate within the resources, capacity, and 
legislative contexts in Queensland. The design of the system was therefore 
influenced by the high number of weekly hepatitis C notifications, a lack of 
legislative requirements for clinicians to notify the Queensland State 
Department of Health upon diagnosing HCV infections, and the ability to 
extract case information from the state Notifiable Conditions System (NOCS) 
and laboratory test results from AUSLAB in CDB. 
 
The key processes in development of the system included engaging relevant 
stakeholders, developing and applying case definitions, changes to NOCS to 
allow for the coding of newly acquired cases, developing a data linkage process 
for matching of new notifications with previous pathology test results, a 
retrospective identification of newly acquired infections, incorporating data 
linkage processes into routine notification activities within the CDB, 
development and implementation of a diagnosing clinician surveillance form, 
and developing an enhanced surveillance and follow-up process for certain 
newly acquired cases to be completed by PHU staff. 
 
Stakeholder engagement 
As no previous surveillance system for newly acquired hepatitis C infections 
existed at the commencement of this project, and follow-up of unspecified 
hepatitis C infections by PHU staff did not occur, it was necessary to consult 
relevant stakeholders (Box 2) during the development and implementation of 
the surveillance system. Stakeholders were engaged to inform them of changes 
to hepatitis C surveillance processes, gain input related to their roles and 
responsibilities in the surveillance and follow-up of hepatitis C infections, and 
ensure the developed system was both acceptable and sustainable. Part of the 
stakeholder engagement process involved presentations at Queensland public 
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health physician face-to-face meetings in October 2016 and June 2017, and at a 
Queensland public health nurse face-to-face meeting in June 2017. 
 
Box 2—Stakeholders and their roles in surveillance of hepatitis C infections in 
Queensland 
 Communicable Diseases Branch staff  
 State-wide surveillance  
 Reporting to the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System  
 Communication with Public Health Units  
 Public Health Unit staff  
 Enhanced surveillance of newly acquired cases  
 Reporting to the Communicable Diseases Branch  
 Investigation of potential threats to public health  
 Clinicians  
 Reporting information of newly acquired cases to Communicable Diseases Branch  
 Patient care  
   
 
To inform clinicians that they may be asked to provide information regarding 
reasons for testing and risk factors of patients they diagnose with newly 
acquired hepatitis C, a notice was placed in the newsletter of the Queensland 
branch of the Royal Australasian College of General Practitioners (Box 3). 
 
Box 3—Notice from the Royal Australasian College of General Practitioners to 
Queensland Fellows and trainees regarding faxing of surveillance forms to diagnosing 
clinicians of newly acquired cases of hepatitis C 
 
 
Notification method 
Laboratory notifications of hepatitis C cases are transmitted electronically to the 
NOCS electronic database in the State Department of Health. A notification is 
triggered by either detection of anti-HCV antibody or detection of HCV genetic 
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material by nucleic acid testing. After one notification has been created for an 
individual, no new notifications will occur as a result of subsequent positive 
HCV test results in the same individual. All new notifications of hepatitis C are 
automatically initially classified as unspecified by NOCS. 
 
Newly acquired case definitions 
The CDNA case definition requires confirmed cases of newly acquired hepatitis 
C to have either laboratory definitive evidence or laboratory suggestive evidence 
and clinical evidence (Box 1). 
 
Laboratory definitive evidence 
The laboratory definitive evidence case definition, requiring evidence of a 
previous negative anti-HCV antibody within 24 months in a case of confirmed 
HCV infection, was used to classify notifications as newly acquired. 
 
Clinical evidence 
From 2017, the clinical evidence definition of alanine transaminase (ALT) levels 
greater than 10 times the upper limit of normal was used to identify cases of 
potentially newly acquired infection. Other potential causes of acute hepatitis 
were identified through the diagnosing clinician surveillance form. The clinical 
evidence definition was not used to identify newly acquired infections prior to 
2017 as it was not feasible to identify and contact all diagnosing clinicians in 
order to exclude other causes of acute hepatitis. 
 
Queensland Pathology defines the upper limit of normal for ALT as <45 
units/litre (u/L) for men and <34 u/L for women; therefore, an ALT level ≥450 
u/L for men and ≥340 u/L for women defined 10 times the upper limit of 
normal. To limit the identification of individuals with chronic hepatitis, only 
those with evidence of acutely elevated ALT levels were considered as 
potentially newly acquired infections. We defined the acute period as 56 days 
before to 28 days after the collection of the notifying specimen. This period was 
chosen as, during acute HCV infection, ALT levels generally rise one to two 
weeks following the presence of detectable HCV RNA, and up to eight weeks 
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before anti-HCV antibodies become detectable.5,6,21,22 Individuals with elevated 
ALT levels both during and before the acute period were considered to have 
chronically elevated ALT levels and less likely to represent acute hepatitis; these 
cases were therefore not followed-up as potential newly acquired infections. 
 
The clinical evidence definitions involving presence of jaundice or bilirubinuria 
were not used as this clinical information was not easily accessible or available, 
and therefore not feasible to include in the design of the surveillance system. 
 
Changes to the Notifiable Conditions System 
A notification category for newly acquired hepatitis C was created in NOCS to 
allow for coding of the cases identified through the system as meeting the case 
definition. Enhanced surveillance fields were added to reflect the information 
being collected in the diagnosing clinician surveillance form and updated 
hepatitis C case report form (CRF). 
 
Data extraction and linkage 
Linkage of AUSLAB testing and NOCS notification data 
Hepatitis C (unspecified) notifications with onset dates from 01 January 2011 to 
31 December 2016 were extracted from NOCS. Negative anti-hepatitis C 
antibody test results collected between 01 January 2009 and 31 December 2016 
were extracted from AUSLAB. NOCS and AUSLAB data were imported into 
Stata 14.1 (StataCorp, USA) and matching was performed using the reclink23 
package, with full name, sex, date of birth, first two letters of first name, and 
first two letters of last name as linking variables. Probability matching was only 
performed on cases with same date of birth. Matching weights and non-
matching weights of linking variables are provided in Box 4. A probability match 
score of ≥0.80 was used to define positive matches. The matching weights were 
chosen after trialling multiple combination of weights and manually reviewing 
the linkage results for false positive and false negative matches above and below 
the 0.80 probability match score, respectively. Positive matches with anonymity 
coded names (e.g. first two letters of last name, first two letters of first name) 
recorded in either the NOCS or AUSLAB patient details were considered a true 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY IN QUEENSLAND 
58 
match if each of date of birth, sex, first two letters of first name, and first two 
letters of last name were exact matches. Positive matches were manually 
reviewed by Data Services staff to ensure sufficient information was present to 
indicate a true match. The notification classification of all true matches meeting 
the newly acquired case definition was changed to newly acquired by Data 
Services staff. 
 
Box 4—Matching and non-matching weights of linking variables used for probabilistic 
matching* of hepatitis C notifications with previous negative anti-HCV antibody test 
results in Stata using reclink23 package 
 Linking variable Matching weight† Non-matching weight†  
 Full name 12 6  
 First 2 letters of first name 6 6  
 First 2 letters of last name 6 8  
 Date of birth‡ 10 10  
 Sex 2 6  
 *A probability match score of ≥0.80 used as the cut-off for a positive match. †Matching and non-matching 
weights have a possible range of 1–20. ‡Probability match scores only generated for records with the same 
date of birth. 
 
 
Notifications in those aged younger than 24 months of age at the time of 
diagnosis were manually reviewed to determine if they met the age-specific 
requirements of the national case definition (Box 1, laboratory definitive 
evidence criteria 3 and 4). 
 
Matched cases were identified as being imprisoned at the time of diagnosis if a 
correctional centre was listed as the address for the patient received by NOCS 
via the laboratory notification process. Cases were considered to have been 
imprisoned in the previous 24 months if any previous negative anti-HCV 
antibody or elevated ALT test extracted from AUSLAB had a correctional centre 
recorded as the patient address. 
 
Weekly notification process 
The above extraction and linkage process was integrated into the Queensland 
weekly notifiable conditions reporting process within the CDB in January 2017. 
For cases notified from 01 January 2017, the AUSLAB data extraction included 
records with elevated ALT levels in addition to negative hepatitis C antibody 
tests. The sustainability of the system was assessed according to the required 
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time for the extraction and linkage process, and the number of surveillance 
forms faxed to diagnosing clinicians. 
 
I prepared a Work Instruction (Appendix B) for CDB staff detailing the data 
extraction and linkage processes. I also created a Stata .do file that was used to 
perform the linkage each week by a member of the Data Services or the 
Epidemiology & Research teams. Positive matches were exported into a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and manually reviewed for sufficient matching 
information by Data Services staff. True matches were updated to hepatitis C 
(newly acquired) in NOCS. The date of the most recent negative anti-HCV 
antibody test, presence of imprisonment at the time of diagnosis or in the 
previous 24 months, and if the case was identified through acutely elevated ALT 
levels were recorded in the relevant NOCS enhanced surveillance fields. 
 
Data analysis 
Newly acquired and unspecified infections from 2011 to 2016 were compared by 
age group (younger than 30 years, 30 years or older), sex, and imprisonment 
status at the time of diagnosis using the chi-square test of proportions, with a p-
value <0.05 considered significant. Analyses were performed in Stata 14.1. 
 
Comparison with other states & territories  
Newly acquired and unspecified hepatitis C notification counts from 2011 to 
2016 were compared to those in other states and territories using publicly 
available reports from the NNDSS.24 Notification rates for states and territories 
during this period were calculated using mid-year estimated resident population 
(ERP) estimates from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).25 
 
Diagnosing clinician surveillance form 
I developed a surveillance form to fax to the diagnosing clinicians of newly 
acquired hepatitis C notifications (Appendix C). The surveillance form was used 
to collect information regarding reasons for hepatitis C testing and identified 
risk factors for acquiring HCV infection. For cases identified as potentially 
newly acquired infections identified as such by the presence of acutely elevated 
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ALT levels, the diagnosing clinician surveillance form included an extra 
question regarding other possible causes for the elevated ALT levels, such as 
other viral hepatitis, hepatotoxic drugs, or other liver conditions.  
 
In developing the surveillance form, I engaged primary care clinics and public 
health physicians to provide feedback regarding the information being collected, 
design of the form, and ease of use. To identify clinicians that would likely be 
completing the form, I reviewed hepatitis C notifications from 2011 to 2015 and 
identified primary care clinics that diagnosed the highest numbers of hepatitis C 
notifications. A draft of the surveillance form was sent to three of these primary 
care clinics and PHU public health physicians for feedback, which was 
incorporated into the final version of the form. 
 
Enhanced surveillance case report form 
A Queensland enhanced surveillance CRF had previously been developed in 
2011 for newly acquired hepatitis C. As newly acquired infections were not 
previously being identified or followed up, the previous CRF was not in use. I 
updated the enhanced surveillance CRF (Appendix D) to align with fields 
reported to the NNDSS and to collect useful information to assist in detecting 
cases, or clusters of cases, not related to injecting drug use. 
 
Evaluation 
A formal evaluation of the surveillance system was not undertaken as this was 
not possible within the timeframe of my MAE placement. However, the 
strengths and limitations of the surveillance system are addressed in the 
Discussion section in relation to the system attributes defined by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health 
Surveillance Systems.26 
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Results 
Timeline 
The timeline of the establishment of the surveillance system from initial scoping 
until final implementation is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1—Timeline of the development and implementation of a surveillance system to 
identify and follow-up notifications of newly acquired hepatitis C infections in 
Queensland. CDB, Communicable Diseases Branch; NOCS, Notifiable Conditions 
System; NNDSS, National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System. 
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System design 
The processes involved in the operation of the surveillance system, including 
identification of newly acquired hepatitis C infections, completion of 
surveillance forms by diagnosing clinicians, and enhanced surveillance and 
follow-up of cases by PHUs, are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Linkage of AUSLAB testing and NOCS notification data  
From 2011 to 2016, there were 14,975 notifications of hepatitis C received in 
Queensland. Matching of notifications to previous anti-HCV antibody testing 
history identified 1,735 (12%) infections as newly acquired. Three additional 
notifications were classified as newly acquired in children aged younger than 24 
months, with HCV detected by nucleic acid testing. The demographic 
characteristics of newly acquired and unspecified hepatitis C notifications 
during this period are shown in Table 1. The data linkage algorithm resulted in a 
false-positive match rate of less than one percent, and occurred due to similarity 
between full names and an identical date of birth. 
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Figure 2—Design of surveillance system to identify and follow-up cases of newly 
acquired hepatitis C infections in Queensland. ALT, alanine transaminase; AUSLAB, 
Queensland Pathology results software; HCV, hepatitis C virus; NOCS, notifiable 
conditions system. 
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Table 1—Characteristics of newly acquired and unspecified hepatitis C notifications by 
age, sex, imprisonment status, and year of notification, Queensland, 2011–2016 
  Newly acquired Unspecified Total  
  n=1,735 (%) n=13,240 (%) n=14,975 (%)  
 Age group (years)        
 <2 3 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.0)  
 2–19 167 (9.6) 359 (2.7) 526 (3.5)  
 20–29 956 (55.1) 2,699 (20.4) 3,655 (24.4)  
 30–39 446 (25.7) 3,739 (28.2) 4,185 (27.9)  
 40–49 128 (7.4) 3,208 (24.2) 3,336 (22.3)  
 50–59 26 (1.5) 2,483 (18.8) 2,509 (16.8)  
 ≥60 9 (0.5) 752 (5.7) 761 (5.1)  
 Sex        
 Male 1,319 (76.0) 8,637 (65.2) 9,956 (66.5)  
 Female 416 (24.0) 4,603 (34.8) 5,019 (33.5)  
 Imprisoned at time of notification       
 Yes 831 (47.9) 1,634 (12.3) 2,465 (16.5)  
 No 904 (52.1) 11,606 (87.7) 12,510 (83.5)  
 Year of notification        
 2011 210 (12.1) 2,149 (16.2) 2,359 (15.8)  
 2012 237 (13.7) 2,080 (15.7) 2,317 (15.5)  
 2013 275 (15.9) 2,158 (16.3) 2,433 (16.2)  
 2014 267 (15.4) 2,282 (17.2) 2,549 (17.0)  
 2015 371 (21.4) 2,174 (16.4) 2,545 (17.0)  
 2016 375 (21.6) 2,397 (18.1) 2,772 (18.5)  
         
 
Males made up a significantly higher proportion of newly acquired notifications 
compared to the proportion of unspecified notifications (76% vs. 65%; χ2, 80.1; 
p<0.001). The proportion of notifications received in individuals who were 
imprisoned at the time of diagnosis was significantly higher in those identified 
as newly acquired compared to those classified as unspecified (48% vs. 12%; χ2, 
1410.2; p<0.001). The proportion of cases aged younger than 30 years was 
significantly higher among those notifications identified as newly acquired 
compared to unspecified (65% vs. 23%; χ2, 1331.4; p<0.001). 
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Comparison with other states and territories 
From 2011 to 2016, there were 4,254 notifications of newly acquired hepatitis C 
in Australia, representing 7% of all (unspecified and newly acquired) national 
hepatitis C notifications. The crude annual number of newly acquired 
notifications was highest in Queensland (Table 2), with Queensland accounting 
for 41% of newly acquired notifications Australia-wide during this period. 
Within each state, the percentage of all hepatitis C notifications reported as 
newly acquired was highest in Western Australia (12%), followed by Queensland 
(12%). Since 2012, Western Australia and Queensland reported the highest 
newly acquired notification rates, with the lowest reported in New South Wales 
and the Northern Territory (Table 3). The Northern Territory reported the 
highest unspecified notification rates, while the lowest was reported in South 
Australia. 
 
Results of the weekly notification process 
Extracting notification data from NOCS, updating anti-HCV antibody testing 
data from AUSLAB, and performing data linkage in Stata required 
approximately 30 minutes as part of weekly notifiable conditions reporting.  
 
From 01 January 2017 to 30 June 2017, there were 1,183 new notifications of 
hepatitis C in Queensland, of which 148 (13%) were identified as newly 
acquired, representing an average of 5.7 newly acquired cases per week. Of 
these, 145 (98%) were identified through previous negative anti-HCV antibody 
test results and 3 (2%) were identified through acutely elevated ALT levels. 
There were an additional 15 potentially newly acquired cases identified through 
acutely elevated ALT levels that remained classified as unspecified. These 15 
cases either had other causes for acute hepatitis identified through the 
diagnosing clinician surveillance form or other causes were not able to be 
excluded because the surveillance form was not returned. 
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Diagnosing clinician surveillance form 
From 13 February to 30 June 2017, there were 62 surveillance forms sent to 
diagnosing clinicians related to people with newly acquired infections. Forty-
nine (79% response rate) diagnosing clinician forms were completed and 
returned. Of these, six did not have injecting drug use or imprisonment in the 
previous 24 months identified as risk factors. For the 13 diagnosing clinician 
forms not returned, 10 (77%) had a history of injecting drug use identified in the 
electronic medical records. The three remaining cases with unreturned 
diagnosing clinician forms were not returned despite further requests to 
complete the form, as per the system design (Figure 2). 
 
Enhanced surveillance 
The six cases of newly acquired infection without injecting drug use or 
imprisonment identified as risk factors were followed-up by staff from the 
relevant PHUs using the enhanced surveillance case report form. All six cases 
were identified by the relevant PHUs as likely IDU-related HCV infections. 
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Discussion 
This project resulted in the successful implementation of a new surveillance 
system to identify and report newly acquired infections of hepatitis C virus in 
Queensland. An enhanced surveillance process was also implemented to gather 
risk factor data from diagnosing clinicians and, where required, follow-up by 
PHU staff. The retrospective identification of newly acquired infections from 
2011 to 2016 has established baseline information on newly acquired 
notification rates, allowing for the monitoring of trends in HCV acquisition. This 
is of particular importance given the recent introduction and availability of 
highly effective curative treatments for HCV infection. 
 
The system identified relatively high proportions and rates of newly acquired 
HCV infections when compared with other states and territories. This can 
largely be attributed to the process of probability matching notification data 
with previous pathology test results, which provided an accurate and efficient 
method of identifying newly acquired infections. To our knowledge, Queensland 
is the only state to use data linkage for the surveillance of newly acquired HCV 
infections. Given the benefits of data linkage over manual review processes or 
relying on clinician information to identify newly acquired infections, if this 
process were to be implemented by other states and territories, it would likely 
result in improved case ascertainment and efficiency for their respective 
surveillance processes. 
 
Our system identified nearly half of all newly acquired HCV infections were 
imprisoned at the time of diagnosis, approximately three times the proportion 
of unspecified cases. A major contributor to this is likely to be that many 
prisoners are screened through Queensland Pathology services for HCV and 
other blood-borne viruses upon prison entry, and are therefore more likely to 
have previous HCV testing history to enable identification of newly acquired 
infections. Additional contributing factors to the high proportion of imprisoned 
cases may also relate to the fact that Queensland has the second highest total 
number of incarcerations (after NSW), the third highest total number of 
incarcerations for illicit drug offences (after NSW and Victoria), the highest 
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number of both sentenced and unsentenced prisoners for possession or use of 
illicit drugs, and the third highest proportion of prisoners with previous 
imprisonment (after ACT and NT).27 These prisoner statistics likely contribute 
to both the high overall number and proportion of imprisoned newly acquired 
HCV infections identified. 
 
Usefulness 
The established surveillance system was successful in meeting the objectives 
defined previously in this Chapter. Estimates of the number of newly acquired 
infections in Queensland, and collection of risk factor data, are now 
incorporated into weekly surveillance activities within the CDB. Given the large 
proportion of newly acquired infections identified in the prison population, this 
data may be used by PHUs and the State Department of Health to engage 
correctional centres in further studies and in the development of treatment 
programs for prisoners, a priority population in state28 and national strategies.29 
 
The system can also potentially identify non-IDU-related HCV infections, 
though only if they have undergone previous HCV testing or have acutely 
elevated ALT test results through Pathology Queensland. The inability to 
efficiently access both interstate and private HCV laboratory testing data limits 
the usefulness of this system in its ability to detect all newly acquired cases, and 
therefore cases of non-IDU-related HCV infection. However, where cases of 
non-IDU-related HCV infection are not detected by the system, individuals or 
their clinicians are able to alert their local PHU with concerns about potential 
exposure risks. In such instances, the existence of the current system would 
demonstrate to the public that the Department of Health conducts routine 
surveillance to detect such occurrences, and therefore also provides an element 
of protection from any associated public health risk. Previously, the lack of such 
a system may have been a point of potential criticism, particularly given 
Queensland was the only state not to identify or report newly acquired HCV 
infections. 
 
An additional method to increase system usefulness would be to legislate 
hepatitis C as a notifiable condition upon laboratory testing. As negative anti-
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HCV antibody test results would be automatically notified, such legislation, 
similar to that in British Columbia, Canada,30 would provide efficient access to 
all negative hepatitis C test results, both public and private, through NOCS. This 
legislative change would result in increased case ascertainment and overall 
usefulness of the system. However, such a legislative change may lead to privacy 
concerns among the community and lead to a decreased willingness to undergo 
hepatitis C testing, potentially leading to significant harms from undiagnosed 
hepatitis C. This type of approach would require significant communication 
from the State Department of Health that address any concerns and emphasise 
that any legislative changes are in the public interest. 
 
Another legislative option to improve case ascertainment would be to make 
newly acquired hepatitis C a ‘clinically notifiable condition’ in the Public Health 
Regulation 2005.11 This could potentially increase the number of newly 
acquired hepatitis C cases notified that have evidence of clinical hepatitis (Box 
1), but no negative anti-HCV antibody test results within the previous 24 
months. Though clinicians have been historically poor at notifying clinical 
infectious disease conditions,31,32 the reporting of any newly acquired cases that 
would otherwise go undetected might increase the system’s usefulness. Even 
small increases in case ascertainment can result in significant impacts, as a 
single case of non-IDU-related HCV infection may identify ongoing public 
health threats, thus enabling a response to prevent further transmission. 
 
Simplicity 
The underlying Stata code I developed for the data linkage process is technically 
complex, and any alterations to the linkage algorithm requires someone familiar 
with Stata code and data manipulation. However, the benefits of the data 
linkage process are the accuracy and efficiency in how it operates, and the 
weekly surveillance activities are simple to perform and require no technical 
expertise. Performing the data extraction and linkage required little training 
and the necessary steps were detailed in the Work Instruction (Appendix B). 
The newly acquired laboratory definitive evidence case definition was easy to 
apply, whereas the clinical evidence definition requires other causes of acute 
hepatitis to be excluded. Future evaluations of the system should review the 
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benefits of using the clinical evidence case definition, with regards to increased 
case ascertainment, against the added complexity and resources required to 
include this aspect of the system. Evaluations of the system could also include 
exploring improved systematic identification of other causes of acute hepatitis, 
such as through the inclusion of hepatitis B serology, hepatitis A serology, and 
aspartate aminotransferase levels in the AUSLAB data extract. 
 
Flexibility 
There were no new demands or changes to information needs during the 
implementation of this system. However, the fields reported to the NNDSS for 
newly acquired hepatitis C are currently under review, with the potential 
addition and removal of some fields (Appendix A). Adapting to these changes 
would require that the relevant information is collected, either through the 
diagnosing clinician surveillance form or the enhanced surveillance case report 
form, or both. Changes would also be required to the enhanced surveillance 
fields in NOCS and how these fields are reported electronically to the NNDSS. 
These changes could be incorporated into the current system in a timely 
manner. 
 
The addition of a new national classification for hepatitis C notifications—
reinfection—was also being reviewed during the establishment of this system. At 
the time of writing, a case definition for reinfection had not been determined, 
though it would likely involve evidence of HCV clearance through negative HCV 
nucleic acid testing. A separate system would need to be implemented to 
identify cases of HCV reinfection. As the current system only test results from 
the public pathology laboratory, a new system to identify HCV reinfection would 
possess this same limitation. In order to differentiate between reinfection after 
spontaneous clearance or after treatment, additional information would also 
need to be gathered from treating clinicians or prescribing data from the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. 
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Data quality 
Matching new hepatitis C notifications with previous HCV antibody and ALT 
test results provided an accurate method to identify notifications meeting 
components of the newly acquired case definition. Manual review of identifying 
information in NOCS and AUSLAB by the Data Services Team for matches 
provided a quality assurance process to assess the likelihood of a true match, 
and successfully identified false positive matches that did occur. This process 
was particularly important for cases where the notification or testing data had 
been anonymity coded.  
 
Imprisonment, either at the time of diagnosis or within the previous 24 months, 
is able to be accurately and systematically captured for all identified cases of 
newly acquired infection through patient location recorded in NOCS and 
AUSLAB data extracts. Additional risk factor data were collected through the 
diagnosing clinician surveillance form and enhanced surveillance CRF, though 
the quality of these data is dependent on both the case information available to 
the clinician, and the information disclosed by the case. Additionally, cases 
identified as newly acquired through acutely elevated ALT levels may have other 
reasons for acute hepatitis that are unknown to the diagnosing clinician, and not 
a result of acute HCV infection. As mentioned, the use of the clinical evidence 
case definition in the system should be explored in future evaluations. 
 
Acceptability 
The data linkage process was developed with the aim of being sustainable and 
incorporated into weekly notifications reporting. This was successfully achieved, 
with the data extraction and linkage taking fewer than 30 minutes to complete 
as part of the weekly notification process. The relatively small number of 
diagnosing clinician surveillance forms to be faxed on a weekly basis (<6) also 
meant that minimal resources were required from the Data Services Team to 
perform this task.  
 
The relatively high response rate (79%) of diagnosing clinicians completing the 
surveillance form is an indicator that this task was largely acceptable among this 
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group. The engagement process with general practitioners in developing the 
form was likely a key contributing factor in achieving this outcome. This process 
assisted us in ensuring the significance of the form was clear, and that the form 
was able to be completed accurately and efficiently. 
 
The acceptability of the system to PHU staff is difficult to determine at this 
stage, as at 30 June 2017, only six cases had required follow-up during 2017, 
which was completed using the updated CRF. Future evaluations of the system 
should involve a formal assessment of PHU follow-up processes. 
 
Sensitivity 
By matching hepatitis C notifications from 2011 to 2016 with previous HCV 
testing data, the system identified 12% of all hepatitis C notifications as newly 
acquired infections. As previously mentioned, given the lack of previous private 
laboratory testing data, this is an underestimate of the true number of newly 
acquired HCV infections. An additional consideration is that the high 
proportion of both asymptomatic and non-specific illnesses during the acute 
phase of infection will result in an undercount of hepatitis C notifications. 
Quantifying the sensitivity of the system to identify newly acquired HCV 
infections is not possible as the true number of HCV infections that were 
acquired in the preceding 24 months before diagnosis is unknown. However, 
comparison of the proportion of all hepatitis C notifications reported as newly 
acquired with other states and territories allows for an estimate of the relative 
sensitivity of the system. This proportion for Queensland was the second highest 
in Australia from 2011 to 2016, and the highest in 2016. The use of public 
laboratory services for correctional centres in Queensland and Western 
Australia, and the availability of these data, likely contributed to the high 
proportions of newly acquired infections identified in these two states.  
 
As previously discussed, the ability to systematically access private laboratory 
HCV testing data would improve the identification of newly acquired cases, 
though would require legislative changes that require provision of negative 
testing data for surveillance purposes. While manually reviewing individual 
private laboratory testing data is possible within the CDB, the extra resources 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY IN QUEENSLAND 
74 
required to undertake this task meant that it was not pursued. Future 
improvements of the system could consider scoping possible methods to 
efficiently access and use private laboratory testing data for improved 
identification of newly acquired HCV infections. 
 
The sensitivity of the system to detect non-IDU-related cases or clusters is 
influenced by the total number of cases identified as newly acquired, and the 
ability of the diagnosing clinician surveillance form and PHU follow-up to 
identify these cases. Due to the asymptomatic nature of HCV infection, clusters 
of related cases may be spread over time. Additionally, cases that belong to a 
cluster would only be followed up if they meet the newly acquired case 
definition. The ability of the system to identify an epidemiological link between 
cases in a cluster is likely to be limited, and relies on enhanced surveillance. The 
most likely scenario in which a cluster of non-IDU-related HCV transmission is 
identified would occur after PHU follow-up of a single case without traditional 
risk factors for HCV transmission, subsequently triggering a public health 
investigation and response. The hepatitis C CDNA Series of National Guidelines 
for Public Health Units provides information for PHUs to assist with exposure 
investigations and management of a potential cluster of cases.33 
 
Faxing surveillance forms to a selected proportion of clinicians who diagnose 
new notifications of unspecified disease could potentially improve case 
ascertainment, through would require extra resources. For instance, a 30% 
sample of unspecified cases not imprisoned at the time of diagnosis would result 
in an additional 12 faxes per week. A trial of this method could be considered 
and evaluated in future system reviews. 
 
Predictive value positive 
The matching and non-matching weights applied in the linkage algorithm (Box 
4) were developed to provide a high predictive value positive, which was 
achieved, with over 99% of matches representing true matches. This aspect of 
the system improved its acceptability to users performing the linkage and 
entering data, as less time was required to manually review identifying 
information and remove false-positive matches as part of weekly surveillance 
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processes. The false positive matches that occurred, due to individuals with 
similar names and same date of birth, were unavoidable due to the process of 
probabilistic matching. Changes to the matching algorithm to avoid the 
occasional false positive matches would decrease the sensitivity of the system 
and overall case ascertainment.  
 
Representativeness 
The sole use of previous public pathology laboratory testing to identify newly 
acquired cases creates a potential selection bias towards those more likely to use 
public pathology services. As demonstrated in the results, newly acquired cases 
were more commonly male, aged younger than 30 years, and imprisoned at the 
time of diagnosis when compared to unspecified cases. These differences may be 
due to a lack of representativeness or may reflect true differences in the 
characteristics of individuals who have acquired their disease in the 24 months 
before diagnosis. Previous studies have estimated an age at first drug injection 
in Australia of 18–19 years,34,35 with a mean time from first injection to HCV 
seroconversion of 4.4 years.34 Additionally, those attending Needle and Syringe 
Programs who have been imprisoned in the preceding year have higher HCV 
antibody prevalence than those who have not been incarcerated.35 This evidence 
suggests that the demographic characteristics of newly acquired cases identified 
by our system are likely to be representative of individuals who have truly 
acquired their HCV infection within the previous 24 months. As previously 
discussed, representativeness of those identified with newly acquired infections 
could be improved through clinical notification of acute hepatitis C and 
accessing previous private laboratory testing data. 
 
Timeliness 
Due to the high proportion of asymptomatic acute HCV infections and the 10–
14 week incubation period for those who do develop acute hepatitis, the ability 
of any surveillance system to detect clustering of HCV infections in a timely 
manner is limited. As the data linkage occurs on a weekly basis, and diagnosing 
clinicians are advised to return the diagnosing clinician surveillance form within 
14 days, the time from initial hepatitis C notification to the return of the 
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surveillance form may be up to 3 weeks. In cases of potential non-IDU-related 
HCV infection, PHU follow-up should identify potential transmission routes 
that require further investigation. In some instances, such as ‘tampering’ with 
injectable substances in a nosocomial setting,9 there may be an ongoing risk to 
public health that requires a timely response to prevent further HCV 
transmission. However, in the context of the natural history of the disease, the 
time taken for data linkage and gathering of risk factor data is likely to be small 
in comparison to the overall time period the public health threat has existed. 
 
Stability 
The weekly surveillance activities require Stata 14 and extended user access to 
AUSLAB in order to perform the data extraction and linkage processes. In the 
event of leave or illness among staff members who usually perform the linkage 
process, the Work Instruction developed provides other staff with the steps 
required to perform these tasks. Back-ups of the Stata .do file used to perform 
the linkage were maintained to provide an extra measure of stability. Increased 
competency in Stata code writing among Epidemiology and Research Unit team 
members would improve system stability to ensure the system is able to 
continue to operate in the event of unforeseen system failures  
Conclusions 
Surveillance of newly acquired hepatitis C infections is an important public 
health measure to monitor HCV transmission trends and evaluate public health 
interventions. The challenges related to hepatitis C surveillance—high case 
burden, asymptomatic infections, and frequent use of anonymity coded 
testing—made data linkage a suitable and efficient method to identify newly 
acquired infections in Queensland. The established surveillance system 
identified relatively high numbers of newly acquired infections compared to 
other states and territories, while only using previous public pathology test 
results, and therefore represents an underestimate of the true number of newly 
acquired HCV infections. This highlights the importance of access to negative 
pathology test results, both public and private, for certain diseases where 
monitoring of previous negative testing is a key component of its surveillance. 
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Appendix A—Hepatitis C enhanced surveillance fields 
 Injecting drug use   
 Injecting drug use in the previous 2 years Never injected drugs  
 Injecting drug use but not in the previous 2 
years 
Injecting drug use unknown  
 Other risk factors   
 Blood/blood products/tissues in Australia Imprisonment  
 Blood/blood products/tissues overseas Health care worker with no documented exposure  
 Haemodialysis Household contact with HCV  
 Occupational needlestick/biohazardous 
injury in healthcare worker 
Non-IDU remote risk (non-IDU associated risk 
identified, but not in the 24 months prior to 
diagnosis) 
 
 Occupational needlestick/biohazardous 
injury in non-healthcare worker 
Other risk within the 24 months prior to diagnosis   
 Surgical work Risk unable to be determined  
 Major dental surgery Unknown (not recorded)  
 Tattoos Organ transplantation in Australia  
 Acupuncture Organ transplantation overseas  
 Ear or body piercing Non-occupational or unspecified 
needlestick/biohazardous injury 
 
 Perinatal transmission Sexual partner of same sex with HCV  
 Sexual partner of opposite sex with HCV   
 Reason for testing   
 Investigation of symptomatic hepatitis Occupational exposure (exposed)  
 Abnormal liver function test (not 
symptomatic) 
Perioperative  
 Blood or organ donor screen Patient request  
 Prison screen Research or study  
 Antenatal screen Other  
 Drug/alcohol screen Unknown (not recorded)  
 STI screen   
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Appendix B—Hepatitis C work instruction 
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Appendix C—Diagnosing clinician surveillance form 
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Appendix D—Hepatitis C case report form 
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Prologue 
Streptococcus pneumoniae infection is a major cause of mortality and morbidity 
worldwide. The most severe manifestation of S. pneumoniae infection—invasive 
pneumococcal disease (IPD)—is known to occur more commonly in young 
infants, the elderly, and those with medical conditions placing them at elevated 
risk of disease. In Australia, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are 
disproportionately affected by the burden of IPD, with rates up to ten times 
those in the non-Indigenous population.  
 
Countries where universal vaccination programs using pneumococcal protein-
polysaccharide conjugate vaccines (PCVs) have been implemented have 
experienced substantial declines in the rates of IPD, both among targeted and 
non-targeted groups due to the effects of herd protection from reduced bacterial 
carriage in the population. The National Immunisation Program (NIP) currently 
provides a 3-dose primary course of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
to infants at 2, 4, and 6 months of age, while many other countries also provide 
all children with a booster dose at 12 months of age. Children and adults with 
medical conditions placing them at increased risk of IPD are also recommended 
to receive pneumococcal vaccines, depending on their age, previous 
pneumococcal vaccination history, and nature of the underlying condition. 
 
This chapter consists of a data analysis project and an epidemiological study 
that I planned and conducted, which highlight important questions related to 
pneumococcal vaccination policy: (1) do Australian children need a booster dose 
of PCV at 12 months of age to provide long-term protection against 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine serotypes? and (2) does a previous episode of 
IPD increase the risk of future episodes? 
 
Project role 
The dataset used for these projects was obtained through a project proposal by a 
former Queensland PhD candidate, Dr Sarah Sheridan. I was added to the ethics 
application, updated the project proposal and ethics application to obtain more 
recent data, and was provided with the dataset to describe the epidemiology of 
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breakthrough IPD (i.e. conjugate vaccine-type IPD in fully vaccinated children) 
in Queensland in order to answer research question 1. During an exploratory 
analysis of the dataset, I noted a small but not insignificant number of cases of 
recurrent disease. Upon reviewing the literature on recurrent IPD, it was 
discovered that only one population-based study had calculated incidence rates 
to determine the risk of recurrent disease.1 This finding was important, as a 
individuals with a previous episode of IPD were not recommended at the time to 
receive pneumococcal vaccine. Therefore, estimating the risk of recurrent 
disease was then added as a second study, for which I planned and conducted 
the analysis. I performed all data cleaning and analysis of the dataset for both 
studies. Where errors in notification or vaccination records were discovered, I 
provided this information to the relevant members of the Epidemiology and 
Research Unit to improve data quality for future reporting and research. 
 
Lessons learned 
This project was particularly rewarding in applying statistical methods, in this 
case, Cox proportional hazards modelling, to a real-world dataset. As there was 
a significant amount of data cleaning and recoding required in the initial 
dataset, I also learned the importance of keeping a data cleaning log and clearly 
annotating Stata .do files so that myself or others can follow the procedures 
taken in the future. In addition, I presented both pieces of work at national and 
international conferences; this experience provided me with valuable feedback 
on both the methods and practical implications of these projects. 
 
Public health impact 
I presented the findings of these studies at several meetings and conferences 
(see below). My supervisor and I also wrote a letter to the Australian Technical 
Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) (Appendix A) with our findings of 
the significantly increased risk of recurrent disease, suggesting those with a 
previous episode of IPD be included in the list of high-risk groups 
recommended to receive pneumococcal vaccination in the Pneumococcal 
disease chapter of the Australian Immunisation Handbook. This 
recommendation is currently under consideration by ATAGI. 
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The findings in the Queensland dataset also led me to plan national studies of 
breakthrough and recurrent IPD. Ethics approval and the national dataset have 
been obtained, though issues with data completeness have not allowed me to 
undertake analysis as part of my MAE projects, but will still be undertaken in 
the future. Findings from the national studies will provide additional evidence 
to inform pneumococcal vaccination policy in Australia. 
 
Communication 
I communicated the findings of these two projects through the following: 
• Estimating the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland, 2001-2015, NCIRS Biostatistics and Epidemiology Special 
Interest Group, Westmead, NSW, Australia, 3 August 2016 
• Estimating the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland, 2001-2015, MAE reports from the field, Canberra, ACT, 
Australia, 30 August 2016 
• Estimating the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland, 2001-2015, Queensland Regional Gerry Murphy Presentation, 
Herston, QLD, Australia, 17 August 2016 
• Breakthrough cases of invasive pneumococcal disease in Queensland 
children following the introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, 
2001–2015. Australian Epidemiological Association 23rd Annual Scientific 
Meeting, Canberra, Australia, 14–16 September 2016 
• Estimating the risk of recurrent pneumococcal disease—Queensland, 
Australia, 2001–2015. 8th Southeast Asia and Western Pacific Bi-Regional 
TEPHINET conference, Siem Reap, Cambodia, 28 November–02 December 
2016 
• Estimating the risk of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease in 
Queensland, 1997–2015. 15th World Congress on Public Health, Melbourne, 
Australia, 03–07 April 2017 
• Letter to ATAGI recommending the inclusion of those with previous IPD as 
an at-risk group recommended to receive pneumococcal vaccination in the 
Australian Immunisation Handbook (Appendix A) 
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Core MAE requirements addressed 
• Analysis of a public health dataset—breakthrough IPD 
• Plan and conduct an epidemiological study—recurrent IPD 
• Presentation at national and international conferences 
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Abstract 
Breakthrough IPD 
Background: Publicly-funded 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
(7vPCV) was introduced for all Australian infants at 2, 4, and 6 months of age in 
2005 (3+0 schedule), and was replaced by 13vPCV in July 2011. A booster dose 
is available for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children aged 12–18 
months, as well as for children with medical conditions placing them at elevated 
risk of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD). We aimed to describe the 
epidemiology of IPD among Queensland children aged younger than 5 years, 
with emphasis on cases of breakthrough disease. 
 
Methods: Descriptive analysis of enhanced IPD surveillance data and 
vaccination records in children aged younger than 5 years, Queensland, 2001–
2015. Breakthrough cases were defined as those occurring in a child with 3 or 
more doses of the PCV (7v or 13v), where a serotype contained in all 3 PCV 
doses was identified as the infecting serotype. 
 
Results: From 2001 to 2015, 1,165 IPD notifications were reported in 
Queensland children younger than 5 years, with 658 occurring from 2001 to 
2004 and 507 from 2005 to 2015. Forty-three cases of breakthrough IPD 
occurred from 2006 to 2015, the majority (74%) of which occurred since the 
replacement of 7vPCV with 13vPCV. Since 2012, over 60% of breakthrough 
cases were caused by serotype 19A, with serotype 19F (19%) the next most 
common cause of breakthrough disease. The median age of onset for 
breakthrough cases was 22.2 months and the time since last pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine dose to onset of breakthrough disease ranged from 4.5 to 51.6 
months 
 
Conclusions: Universal infant vaccination with pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccines have led to substantial decreases in IPD rates in Queensland children, 
but the number of 13PCV breakthrough cases remain a concern. Booster dose 
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PCV13 scheduling should be considered reduce the burden of breakthrough IPD 
in this age group. 
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Recurrent IPD 
Background: Previous overseas evidence suggests that individuals with 
previous invasive pneumococcal disease are at higher risk of future episodes of 
IPD. Currently, Australian recommendations provide funded pneumococcal 
vaccination to certain groups with medical conditions at elevated risk of IPD, 
but those with previous IPD are not included in these recommendations. We 
sought to estimate the risk of recurrent IPD in Queensland children and adults, 
and explore the potential benefit in providing pneumococcal vaccination to 
those with previous IPD. 
 
Methods: A retrospective cohort study of IPD notifications from 1 January 1997 
to 31 December 2015, using time-to-event analyses to estimate recurrent IPD 
rates. Recurrent IPD was defined as any repeat notification in an individual 
more than 30 days after the collection date of the initial notification. Cases that 
survived more than 14 days after illness onset contributed person-time at risk of 
disease from the date of illness onset until date of death or the end of the study 
period. Primary (first episode) IPD rates were calculated using mid-year 
resident population estimates. 
 
Results: From 1997 to 2015, there were 6,075 notified cases of IPD reported in 
5,955 Queensland residents. Of these, 120 (2.0%) were recurrent episodes that 
occurred in 102 individuals. The annual rate of primary IPD during the study 
period was 7.8 per 100,000 and the recurrent IPD rate was 264.4 per 100,000 
person-years, 35 times the annual incidence of primary IPD. Forty-eight percent 
of individuals with recurrent IPD had no risk factor identified at the time of 
their initial episode. Since 2012, one-third of recurrent episodes were caused by 
13vPCV serotypes, and an additional 27% were caused by the additional 
serotypes contained in 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine.  
 
Conclusions: Individuals with previous IPD are at substantially increased risk 
of future episodes. More than half of recurrent cases may be prevented through 
targeted use of pneumococcal vaccines. Those with previous IPD should be 
recommended and funded for pneumococcal vaccination. 
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Introduction 
Streptococcus pneumoniae is a major cause of bacteraemia, pneumonia, and 
meningitis worldwide, primarily affecting children2 and the elderly.3,4 In 2000, 
S. pneumoniae was estimated to result in over 14 million infections and 
800,000 deaths globally in children younger than 5 years of age, though these 
have likely fallen following increased access to pneumococcal vaccines in low-
income countries.2,5 
 
Pneumococcal infections are categorised as either invasive or non-invasive 
disease. Cases of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) represent severe 
infections, primarily bacteraemia, meningitis, and bacteraemic pneumonia, with 
less common invasive presentations such as septic arthritis and peritonitis also 
occurring.2,4 Non-invasive disease manifestations include community-acquired 
pneumonia (CAP), otitis media, and sinusitis. Over 90 different serotypes of S. 
pneumoniae have been identified, the most common of which have capsular 
antigens contained in pneumococcal vaccines. Transmission occurs via person-
to-person spread through contact with infected respiratory droplets from 
colonised individuals. The burden of IPD is higher among children, the elderly, 
those with predisposing medical conditions, and others in specific at-risk 
categories. Rates of vaccine-type (VT) IPD in Australia have declined 
substantially since the introduction of universal infant vaccination with 
pneumococcal protein-polysaccharide conjugate vaccines through the National 
Immunisation Program (NIP), though rates among Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people (Indigenous Australians) remain disproportionately high.6 
 
In Australia, four pneumococcal-containing vaccines have been funded through 
the NIP (Table 1). Vaccination with the 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine (7vPCV) was initially funded through the NIP in 2001 for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander children and those with medical conditions placing 
them at high-risk of IPD.7 Universal infant vaccination was subsequently 
introduced in 2005, providing a 3-dose primary course without a booster dose 
(3+0) at 2, 4, and 6 months of age. A 7vPCV catch-up program was also funded 
for children younger than 2 years of age, with the number of doses dependent 
on the age at first dose. As a result of serotype replacement,8 a 13vPCV replaced 
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7vPCV on the NIP in July 2011. Vaccination with a 10vPCV was used in the 
Northern Territory from 2009 to October 2011, after which it was also replaced 
with 13vPCV. A national catch-up program was also funded to provide children 
aged 12–35 months, who had completed a primary course with 7vPCV, with a 
supplementary dose of 13vPCV from October 2011 to September 2012.9 A 23-
valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine (23vPPV) has been available in 
Australia since 1999, and is currently recommended and funded for Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander adults aged 50 years and over, non-Indigenous adults 
aged 65 years and over, and those with certain medical conditions associated 
with an increased risk of IPD.7 
 
Table 1—Serotypes of Streptococcus pneumoniae contained in pneumococcal 
vaccines 
 Vaccine Serotypes included in vaccine  
 7vPCV (Prevenar®) 4, 6B, 9V, 14, 18C, 19F, 23F  
 10vPCV (Synflorix®) 1, 4, 5, 6B, 7F, 9V, 14, 18C, 19F, 23F  
 13vPCV (Prevenar 13®) 1, 3, 4, 5, 6A, 6B, 7F, 9V, 14, 18C, 19A, 19F, 23F  
 23vPPV (Pneumovax 23®) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6B, 7F, 8, 9N, 9V, 10A, 11A, 12F, 14, 15B, 17F, 18C, 
19F, 19A, 20, 22F, 23F, 33F 
 
 7v, 7-valent; 10v, 10-valent; 13v, 13-valent; 23v, 23-valent; PCV, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine; PPV, 
pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine; VT, vaccine-type. 
 
 
National vaccination coverage at 12 months of age with 3 doses of pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine has remained over 90% since 2007, and most recently 
estimated at 92.1%.10 In 2004, prior to the introduction of universal infant 
vaccination, the notification rate of IPD in Australia was 11.7 per 100,000. The 
annual notification rate decreased to 8.4 per 100,000 per year in 2011 prior to 
replacement of 7vPCV with 13vPCV, declining further to 6.9 per 100,000 in 
2016.11 The most recent (2012) annual age-specific notification rates have 
remained relatively high in adults aged 65 years or more (19.3 per 100,000) and 
children in the second year of life (15.9 per 100,000).6 In 2012, the rate of IPD 
was also disproportionately higher among Indigenous Australians (42.0 per 
100,000), particularly in Indigenous children younger than 5 years (37.1 per 
100,000).6 While the greatest decreases in VT-IPD have been observed among 
age groups targeted for vaccination through the NIP, indirect protection in other 
age groups has also been observed in Australia6 and overseas.12-14 
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Pneumococcal vaccination schedules and breakthrough disease 
The optimal timing and number of PCV doses to provide as part of a national 
immunisation program depend on the local epidemiology of IPD, cost, and the 
age groups in which the burden is greatest.15 In Australia, the 3+0 schedule was 
implemented due to previous evidence suggesting similar efficacy against 
vaccine-type IPD with either a 3- or 4-dose 7vPCV schedule.7,16 Alternative PCV 
schedules used overseas include both 2- and 3-dose primary courses with a 
booster dose (2+1 and 3+1) at 12 months of age.  
 
Immunogenicity studies have demonstrated that a 3-dose primary PCV course 
results in greater antibody concentrations than a 2-dose primary PCV course at 
6 months of age, though this difference disappears by 12 months of age.17 A 
booster dose as part of a 2+1 schedule results in greater long-term 
immunogenicity compared to a 3+0 schedule,17 but this difference has not been 
demonstrated in relation to IPD outcomes.18 Each of the 3- and 4-dose PCV 
schedules have been effective in reducing VT-IPD, carriage, and in providing 
indirect protection where they have been implemented; differences in the 
effectiveness between schedules are therefore likely to be subtle and dependent 
on the local context.14,18,19 An increase in the number of PCV serotype IPD cases 
had been noted in recent years by the Epidemiology and Research Unit within 
the Communicable Diseases Branch, creating the need for a detailed analysis 
and exploration of these cases. 
 
Pneumococcal vaccination for at-risk groups and recurrent disease 
Pneumococcal vaccination (13vPCV, 23vPPV, or both) is recommended for 
adults with medical conditions associated with an increased risk of IPD such as 
functional or anatomical asplenia, immunocompromising conditions, and 
chronic cardiac and lung diseases. The recommendations for the use of 13vPCV 
and 23vPPV in this group are dependent on the level of risk associated with the 
predisposing condition(s). Children with medical conditions associated with an 
increased risk of IPD are recommended to receive a booster dose of 13vPCV at 
12 months of age in addition to the 3-dose primary course (i.e. 3+1 schedule), 
and a dose of 23vPPV at 4–5 years of age.7 
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Recurrent episodes of IPD have been reported to occur in 2–5% of cases, 
commonly in those with underlying medical conditions placing them at elevated 
risk of disease.1,20-29 However, recurrent IPD also may also occur in 
immunocompetent individuals with no apparent underlying risk factors for 
disease.21,27,30 Evidence from the international literature has demonstrated that 
after an initial episode of IPD, individuals are at significantly higher risk of 
further episodes when compared to the general population,1 typically occurring 
within 12 months of the initial episode. 1,21 
 
Despite the elevated risk of recurrent disease, individuals with previous IPD are 
not included in the recommended list of high-risk groups to receive 
pneumococcal vaccination in Australia.7 No estimates of recurrent disease have 
occurred in the Australian context to quantify the risk in those with a previous 
episode of IPD. Examining the local risk may be useful in informing 
pneumococcal vaccination policy regarding this potentially high-risk group. 
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Aims and objectives 
Breakthrough IPD* 
In the first part of this study, I set out to describe the epidemiology of IPD in 
Queensland children aged younger than 5 years by: 
• describing the burden of IPD by age and infecting serotype. 
• determining the frequency of breakthrough cases of IPD. 
• identifying infecting serotypes causing breakthrough disease. 
• determining the timing of breakthrough disease in relation to the last 
pneumococcal vaccination. 
• identifying factors associated with breakthrough disease. 
• comparing the burden of vaccine-type IPD in children aged younger than 12 
months to the burden of breakthrough IPD. 
 
Recurrent IPD 
In the second part of this study, I set out to describe the epidemiology of 
recurrent IPD in Queensland by: 
• conducting a retrospective cohort study to estimate the risk of recurrent 
disease. 
• identifying factors associated with recurrent disease. 
• identifying the proportion of recurrent episodes that are potentially 
preventable through pneumococcal vaccination. 
                                            
*
 Both 7vPCV (Prevenar®) and 13vPCV (Prevenar 13®) are registered for use as a 
3+1 schedule, whereas a 3+0 schedule is used in Australia through the National 
Immunisation Program. As the vaccination schedule provided is not consistent with 
licensure, the term ‘breakthrough’ is therefore used in this study instead of ‘vaccine 
failure’ to describe cases of IPD caused by a PCV serotype in fully vaccinated children. 
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Methods 
Case definition and surveillance 
IPD has been a notifiable disease in Queensland since 1997 and nationally 
notifiable since 2001. Queensland reports all cases of IPD to the National 
Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS). The national IPD case 
definition requires either the isolation of S. pneumoniae from a normally sterile 
site or the detection of S. pneumoniae nucleic acid from a normally sterile site.31 
There is a 30-day reinfection period for IPD notifications, unless the infecting 
serotype identified in a second specimen is different to that identified in the 
specimen prompting the first notification. In Queensland, notified cases of IPD 
are reviewed by the relevant public health unit (PHU) and Communicable 
Diseases Branch (CDB) epidemiologist responsible for IPD to ensure the case 
definition is met. Enhanced surveillance occurs for all cases of IPD in children 
aged younger than 5 years to ascertain risk factors and pneumococcal 
vaccination history. In IPD cases aged more than 5 years, the CDB 
epidemiologist also collects enhanced surveillance for many cases (through 
electronic hospital records), with an improvement in the collection of data in 
this group over time. Serotyping of S. pneumoniae isolates by the state public 
health reference laboratory, Queensland Forensic and Scientific Services 
(QFSS), became standard practice in 2001. 
 
Data extraction 
Queensland notification records are stored in the Notifiable Conditions System 
(NOCS) and vaccination records in the Vaccine Information and Administration 
System (VIVAS). Notifications of IPD with onset dates from 01 January 1997 to 
31 December 2015 were extracted from NOCS. Notification records included 
age, sex, Indigenous status, date of death, clinical category of IPD (bacteraemia, 
meningitis, pneumonia, other), and any risk factors identified through 
enhanced surveillance (Table 2). Dates of death were updated with Queensland 
all-cause death records by the Health Statistics Branch prior to extraction. 
Records of pneumococcal vaccines (7vPCV, 13vPCV, 23vPPV) received more 
than 14 days prior to illness onset were considered valid for the purposes of 
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disease prevention and were extracted from VIVAS. Vaccination records 
included vaccination date, type, and dose number. In line with the third-dose 
assumption, where a pneumococcal conjugate vaccine was recorded as the third 
dose, the first and second doses were assumed to have been received, even in 
the absence of a record.32 Overall and age-specific notification rates were 
calculated using Queensland mid-year estimated resident populations as the 
denominator.33 Queensland pneumococcal vaccination coverage data were 
available from annual and quarterly reports produced by the National Centre for 
Immunisation Research and Surveillance.10,34-36 
 
Table 2—Risk factor fields and definitions collected as part of enhanced surveillance of 
notified cases of invasive pneumococcal disease 
 Risk factor field Definition  
 Premature Born less than 37 weeks gestation  
 Congenital or chromosomal abnormality Presence of a congenital or chromosomal abnormality  
 Anatomical or functional asplenia A history of splenectomy or the presence of a medical 
condition which results in a non-functioning spleen 
 
 Immunocompromised Presence of an immunocompromising condition or on 
immunosuppressive therapy at the time of diagnosis 
 
 Chronic illness Presence of a chronic illness  
 Childcare attendee Attendance (>4 hrs/week) in a grouped childcare setting 
outside the home anytime within the 4 weeks prior to 
diagnosis 
 
 Excessive alcohol consumption Either ≥4 standard drinks/day for females, ≥6 standard 
drinks/day for males, or alcohol excess noted in medical 
records with related medical condition and/or 
hospitalisation 
 
 Smoking Current or ex-smoker  
 House hold exposure to cigarette smoke Passive household exposure to cigarette smoke even if 
person smokes outside only 
 
    
 
Time period 
Time periods were classified according to the pneumococcal vaccine availability 
through the NIP: 1997–2000 (pre-7vPCV), 2001–2004 (targeted 7vPCV), 
2005–2011 (universal 7vPCV), and 2012–2015 (universal 13vPCV). Due to the 
13vPCV catch-up campaign starting in October 20119 with relatively low 
uptake37 and the July 2011 cohort not completing a 3-dose primary course until 
January 2012, the universal 13vPCV period was chosen to commence in 2012 to 
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allow for a transitional period to achieve sufficient population coverage of the 
six additional serotypes. 
 
Pneumococcal serotypes 
Pneumococcal serotypes were grouped according to the pneumococcal vaccine 
in which they are contained (Table 1), excluding serotypes included in a vaccine 
of lower valency. Pneumococcal serotypes not contained in any vaccine were 
considered non-vaccine type (non-VT). Pneumococcal serotypes were defined as 
unknown/missing if the serotype was recorded as missing, non-typeable, not 
referred, no isolate, or non-viable. Analysis of infecting serotypes was not 
performed for cases with illness onset prior to 2001 (pre-7vPCV) as serotyping 
was not routinely performed during this period. Cases were classified as PCV-
type disease if they were caused by a serotype contained in either 7vPCV or 
13vPCV at a time when the vaccine was provided through the NIP as part of 
universal infant vaccination (7vPCV: 2005–2011; 13vPCV: 2012–2015). 
 
Children younger than 5 years of age and breakthrough IPD 
Notifications of IPD in children younger than 5 years of age at the time of illness 
onset from 2001 to 2015 were analysed to describe the burden of disease in this 
age group. Cases of breakthrough IPD were identified as children younger than 
5 years of age who completed a three-dose course of pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine (7vPCV and/or 13vPCV) more than 14 days prior to illness onset, where 
the infecting serotype was contained in all three doses of the vaccination course. 
Time to last vaccination was defined as the period from the most recent 
vaccination date of a pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, even if 23vPPV had been 
received more recently, until the illness onset date. Pearson’s chi-squared test of 
proportions and Fisher’s exact test (where expected cell frequency was less than 
5) were used to test statistical significance (p-value<0.05). 
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Recurrent IPD 
I conducted a retrospective cohort study to estimate the risk of recurrent IPD in 
Queensland. Recurrent IPD was defined as any repeat notification in an 
individual more than 30 days after the collection date of the initial specimen 
prompting notification, unless a different infecting serotype was identified in an 
earlier specimen. 
 
For primary IPD, the overall, age-specific, sex-specific, clinical category-specific, 
and time period-specific rates were calculated using the average estimated mid-
year resident population for Queensland over the relevant period as the 
denominator. Indigenous- and non-Indigenous-specific rates were calculated 
using the 2006 estimated mid-year resident Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
populations for Queensland as the denominators.38 
 
Time-to-event analyses were performed to estimate the overall and stratified 
rates of recurrent disease. Cases that survived more than 14 days after illness 
onset contributed person-time at risk of disease from the date of illness onset 
until date of death or the end of the study period (31 December 2015). After a 
recurrent episode of IPD, cases were considered to remain at risk of further 
recurrence and therefore continued contributing to the person-time 
denominator. 
 
Univariate and multivariate Cox proportional hazards analyses were performed 
to determine factors identified at the time of the first episode associated with 
recurrent disease. Proportional hazards analyses were performed separately for 
people aged younger than 15 years and those aged 15 years or more due to 
differences in the surveillance and reporting of age-associated risk factors (e.g. 
prematurity in children, excessive alcohol consumption in adults). Likelihood 
ratio tests (LRT) were used to calculate p-values to test the overall significance 
of variables in univariate and multivariate analyses. Wald tests were used to 
calculate p-values for individual strata of categorical variables. After univariate 
analyses, variables with an LRT p<0.25 were included in the initial model for 
multivariate modelling. A backwards selection procedure was used to identify 
variables that were either significant (LRT p<0.05) in the multivariate model or 
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caused a 10% change or more to the adjusted coefficients to be retained in the 
final model. Covariates that were non-significant (LRT p≥0.05) in the 
multivariate model were removed during the backwards selection process. LRTs 
were used to test interactions between covariates included in the final model 
and those with a univariate LRT p<0.25. Where not already included in the final 
model, age and sex were both assessed separately for potential confounding 
(≥10% change in adjusted coefficients of covariates), and retained in the model 
where present. 
 
Proportional hazards assumptions were assessed by examining ln-ln survival 
plots, plots of Kaplan-Meier observed survival curves against Cox predicted 
curves, Schoenfeld residual plots, and testing for a zero slope in the log hazard 
ratio function. 
 
All analyses were performed in Stata IC 14.1 (Stata Corp, USA). 
 
Ethics 
Ethics approval was obtained from the Children’s Health Queensland Hospital 
and Health Service HREC (HREC/13/QRCH/130) and The Australian National 
University HREC (Protocol number 2016/252). Access to data was gained 
through a Public Health Act 2005 application (approval RD004802). 
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Results 
IPD in children younger than 5 years 
From 2001 to 2015, 1,165 IPD notifications were reported in Queensland 
children younger than 5 years, representing 24% of all IPD notifications during 
this period. Of these, 18 (2%) had IPD reported as a cause of death. The annual 
under-5 notification rate was highest in 2001 (73.4 per 100,000), decreasing by 
87% to 9.7 per 100,000 by 2015 (Figure 1). The greatest annual decrease in the 
under-5 notification rate occurred from 2004 to 2005 (-64%), after the 
introduction of universal infant vaccination with 7vPCV. 
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Figure 1—Crude notification counts and annual rates of invasive pneumococcal 
disease in children aged <5 years, Queensland, 2001–2015. 7vPCV, 7-valent 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine; 13vPCV, 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate 
vaccine. 
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Notification rates were generally highest in those aged 12–23 months during the 
study period (Figure 2). Queensland vaccination coverage with three doses of 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (7vPCV or 13PCV) at 12 months of age has 
steadily increased since introduction, reaching 92.4% in 2015, and rising to over 
93% in 2016. 
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Figure 2—Annual notification rates of invasive pneumococcal disease by age group 
and 3-dose pneumococcal conjugate vaccine coverage at 12 months of age,10,34,35 
children aged younger than 5 years, Queensland, 2001–2015 
 
Children aged 12–23 months accounted for 39% of notifications in children 
younger than 5 years of age during the study period (Table 3). From 2012 to 
2015, 46% of IPD notifications were caused by serotypes contained in 13vPCV, 
with an additional 19% caused by additional serotypes contained in 23vPPV. 
Bacteraemia and bacteraemic pneumonia were the most common clinical 
presentations of IPD reported. 
 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY IN QUEENSLAND 
120 
Table 3—Characteristics of notified cases of invasive pneumococcal disease in 
children younger than 5 years of age by pneumococcal vaccine program period, 
Queensland, 2001–2015 
 
 
Targeted 
7vPCV 
(2001–2004) 
Universal 
7vPCV 
(2005–2011) 
Universal 
13vPCV 
(2012–2015) 
Total  
 
 
n=658 (%) n=367 (%) n=140 (%) n=1,165 (%)  
 Age (months)                  
 <12 167 (25.4) 95 (25.9) 34 (24.3) 296 (25.4)  
 12–23 284 (43.2) 128 (34.9) 45 (32.1) 457 (39.2)  
 24–59 207 (31.5) 144 (39.2) 61 (43.6) 412 (35.4)  
 Sex          
 Male 376 (57.1) 221 (60.2) 85 (60.7) 682 (58.5)  
 Female 282 (42.9) 146 (39.8) 55 (39.3) 483 (41.5)  
 Indigenous status                 
 Indigenous 59 (9.0) 56 (15.3) 26 (18.6) 141 (12.1)  
 Non-Indigenous 564 (85.7) 307 (83.7) 113 (80.7) 984 (84.5)  
 Unknown 35 (5.3) 4 (1.1) 1 (0.7) 40 (3.4)  
 Death due to IPD         
 Yes 4 (0.6) 10 (2.7) 4 (2.9) 18 (1.5)  
 No/unknown 654 (99.4) 357 (97.3) 136 (97.1) 1,147 (98.5)  
 Infecting serotype*                
 7vPCV 536 (81.5) 71 (19.3) 15 (10.7) 622 (53.4)  
 13vPCV 67 (10.2) 193 (52.6) 49 (35.0) 309 (26.5)  
 23vPPV 16 (2.4) 32 (8.7) 27 (19.3) 75 (6.4)  
 Non-VT 15 (2.3) 48 (13.1) 39 (27.9) 102 (8.8)  
 Unknown 24 (3.6) 23 (6.3) 10 (7.1) 57 (4.9)  
 Clinical syndrome         
 Bacteraemia 356 (54.1) 144 (39.2) 53 (37.9) 553 (47.5)  
 Meningitis 39 (5.9) 37 (10.1) 12 (8.6) 88 (7.6)  
 Pneumonia 140 (21.3) 142 (38.7) 55 (39.3) 337 (28.9)  
 Pneumonia & 
meningitis 
4 (0.6) 3 (0.8) 2 (1.4) 9 (0.8)  
 Other 0 (0.0) 3 (0.8) 8 (5.7) 11 (0.9)  
 Unknown 119 (18.1) 38 (10.4) 10 (7.1) 167 (14.3)  
 *Grouped by pneumococcal vaccine composition, less those included in vaccines of lower valency. 7v, 7-
valent; 13v, 13-valent; 23v, 23-valent; PCV, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine; PPV, pneumococcal 
polysaccharide vaccine; VT, vaccine type. 
 
 
Prior to universal infant vaccination, 7vPCV serotypes were the predominant 
(81%) cause of IPD (Table 4). After the substitution of 7vPCV with 13vPCV, 
13vPCV (including 7vPCV) serotypes remained the major cause of IPD in 
children younger than 5 years of age (46%). The proportion of cases infected by 
additional serotypes contained in 23vPPV (19%) and non-vaccine-type 
serotypes (28%) since 2012 was considerably higher than during the targeted 
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7vPCV period (23vPPV, 2.4%; non-VT, 2.3%). Of the 64 PCV-type cases since 
2012, 80% occurred in children aged 1–4 years.  
 
Table 4—Infecting serotypes* (grouped by pneumococcal vaccine composition) of 
notified cases of invasive pneumococcal disease in children younger than 5 years by 
pneumococcal vaccine period and age group, Queensland, 2001–2015 
  Targeted 
7vPCV 
(2001–2004) 
Universal 
7vPCV 
(2005–2011) 
Universal 
13vPCV 
(2012–2015) 
Total  
 Age n=658 (%) n=367 (%) n=140 (%) n=1,165 (%)  
 <12 months 167 (25.4) 95 (25.9) 34 (24.3) 296 (25.4)  
 7vPCV 129 (19.6) 23 (6.3) 6 (4.3) 158 (13.6)  
 13vPCV 20 (3.0) 44 (12.0) 7 (5.0) 71 (6.1)  
 23vPPV 9 (1.4) 13 (3.5) 9 (6.4) 31 (2.7)  
 Non-VT 6 (0.9) 9 (2.5) 9 (6.4) 24 (2.1)  
 Unknown 3 (0.5) 6 (1.6) 3 (2.1) 12 (1.0)  
 12–23 months 284 (43.2) 128 (34.9) 45 (32.1) 457 (39.2)  
 7vPCV 235 (35.7) 17 (4.6) 4 (2.9) 256 (22.0)  
 13vPCV 26 (4.0) 77 (21.0) 19 (13.6) 122 (10.5)  
 23vPPV 5 (0.8) 8 (2.2) 8 (5.7) 21 (1.8)  
 Non-VT 7 (1.1) 17 (4.6) 12 (8.6) 36 (3.1)  
 Unknown 11 (1.7) 9 (2.5) 2 (1.4) 22 (1.9)  
 24–59 months 207 (31.5) 144 (39.2) 61 (43.6) 412 (35.4)  
 7vPCV 172 (26.1) 31 (8.4) 5 (3.6) 208 (17.9)  
 13vPCV 21 (3.2) 72 (19.6) 23 (16.4) 116 (10.0)  
 23vPPV 2 (0.3) 11 (3.0) 10 (7.1) 23 (2.0)  
 Non-VT 2 (0.3) 22 (6.0) 18 (12.9) 42 (3.6)  
 Unknown 10 (1.5) 8 (2.2) 5 (3.6) 23 (2.0)  
 *Grouped by pneumococcal vaccine composition, less those included in vaccines of lower valency. 7v, 7-
valent; 13v, 13-valent; 23v, 23-valent; PCV, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine; PPV, pneumococcal 
polysaccharide vaccine; VT, vaccine type. 
 
 
Over half of PCV-type cases since 2012 were caused by serotype 19A (Table 5). 
Additionally, half of all PCV-type cases in this period were cases of 
breakthrough IPD, all occurring in children aged 12–59 months. Since 2012, the 
burden of breakthrough IPD (32 cases) was more than double the burden of 
PCV-type disease in children younger than 12 months (13 cases). 
 
Of the 13 infants younger than 12 months of age who experienced PCV-type 
disease since 2012, seven were younger than 2 months, four were aged 2–3 
months, one was aged 4–5 months, and one was age 6 months. Three (23%) of 
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these cases had prematurity identified as a risk factor. Each of the six cases aged 
2–5 months, and one case younger than 2 months, had received one 13vPCV 
dose. The single case aged 6 months had received two doses of 13vPCV, and 
their infection was caused by serotype 3.  
 
Table 5—Characteristics of PCV-type* invasive pneumococcal disease in children 
younger than 5 years, Queensland, 2012–2015 
  Age <12 months 12–23 months 24–59 months Total  
   n=13 (%) n=23 (%) n=28 (%) n=64 (%)  
 Sex                  
 Male 9 (69.2) 16 (69.6) 17 (60.7) 42 (65.6)  
 Female 4 (30.8) 7 (30.4) 11 (39.3) 22 (34.4)  
 Infecting serotype          
7vPCV 6 (46.2) 4 (17.4) 5 (17.9) 15 (23.4)  
 4 0 (0.0) 1 (4.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.6)  
 6B 0 (0.0) 1 (4.3) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.6)  
 18C 1 (7.7) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 2 (3.1)  
 19F 4 (30.8) 2 (8.7) 4 (14.3) 10 (15.6)  
 9V 1 (7.7) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.6)  
13vPCV 7 (53.8) 19 (82.6) 23 (82.1) 49 (76.6)  
 1 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (7.1) 2 (3.1)  
 3 3 (23.1) 2 (8.7) 3 (10.7) 8 (12.5)  
 7F 2 (15.4) 0 (0.0) 4 (14.3) 6 (9.4)  
 19A 2 (15.4) 17 (73.9) 14 (50.0) 33 (51.6)  
 Breakthrough disease          
 Yes 0 (0.0) 18 (78.3) 14 (50.0) 32 (50.0)  
 No death/unknown 13 (100.0) 5 (21.7) 14 (50.0) 32 (50.0)  
 Death due to IPD          
 Yes 1 (7.7) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 2 (3.1)  
 No 12 (92.3) 23 (100.0) 27 (96.4) 62 (96.9)  
 Clinical category                  
 Bacteraemia 7 (53.8) 9 (39.1) 7 (25.0) 23 (35.9)  
 Meningitis 2 (15.4) 0 (0.0) 1 (3.6) 3 (4.7)  
 Pneumonia 1 (7.7) 11 (47.8) 18 (64.3) 30 (46.9)  
 Other† 1 (7.7) 3 (13.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (6.3)  
 Unknown 2 (15.4) 0 (0.0) 2 (7.1) 4 (6.3)  
 *Cases of invasive pneumococcal disease caused by an infecting serotype contained in 13vPCV. †Includes septic 
arthritis (3) and mastoiditis (1). 7vPCV, 7-valent; 13v, 13-valent; IPD, invasive pneumococcal disease; PCV, 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 
 
 
IV: EPIDEMIOLOGY OF BREAKTHROUGH AND RECURRENT IPD 
123 
Breakthrough IPD 
Forty-three cases of breakthrough IPD occurred from 2006 to 2015, the 
majority (74%) of which occurred since the replacement of 7vPCV with 13vPCV 
(Table 6). The greatest annual number of breakthrough cases occurred in 2015 
(14) and 2013 (11) (Table 7). The median age of onset for breakthrough cases 
was 22.2 months (range, 10.5–57.7) and the time since last pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine dose to onset of breakthrough disease ranged from 4.5 to 51.6 
months (median, 14.3) (Figure 3). 
 
Since 2012, over 60% of breakthrough cases were caused by serotype 19A, with 
serotype 19F (19%) the next most common cause of breakthrough disease. 
Bacterial pneumonia (51%) and bacteraemia (35%) were the most common 
clinical presentations reported in breakthrough cases, with only one (2%) case 
of breakthrough meningitis (3-year-old, serotype 3) identified. 
 
Thirteen cases had received 3 doses of 7vPCV, 28 had 3 doses of 13vPCV, and 
one received 4 doses of 13vPCV. Two breakthrough cases (Case 5 and Case 28) 
in Indigenous children had received a dose of 23vPPV prior to illness onset. 
Case 5 had a congenital abnormality, prematurity, and household exposure to 
cigarette smoke identified as risk factors through enhanced surveillance. 
Household exposure to cigarette smoke was the only risk factor identified for 
Case 28. The single case who had received 4 doses of 13vPCV (Case 42) had a 
chromosomal disorder with associated immunosuppression and also attended 
childcare. 
 
Overall, 56% of breakthrough cases had any risk factor identified through 
routine surveillance, significantly higher than in cases of non-breakthrough 
disease (Table 8). However, the proportion of notifications that attended 
childcare or had a congenital or chromosomal abnormality were the only 
individual risk factors that were significantly higher when comparing cases of 
breakthrough versus non-breakthrough disease. There was no significant 
difference in the proportion of Indigenous children with breakthrough (16.3%) 
and non-breakthrough (16.4%) disease (χ2<0.001; p=0.98). 
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Table 6—Characteristics of breakthrough invasive pneumococcal disease cases in 
children younger than 5 years by pneumococcal vaccine period, Queensland, 2005–
2015 
   Universal 7vPCV 
(2005–2011) 
Universal 13vPCV 
(2012–2015) 
Total  
   n=11 (%) n=32 (%) n=43 (%)  
 Age (months)        
 <12 2 (18.2) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.7)  
 12–23 4 (36.4) 18 (56.3) 22 (51.2)  
 24–59 5 (45.5) 14 (43.8) 19 (44.2)  
 Sex        
 Male 6 (54.5) 23 (71.9) 29 (67.4)  
 Female 5 (45.5) 9 (28.1) 14 (32.6)  
 Indigenous status        
 Indigenous 2 (18.2) 5 (15.6) 7 (16.3)  
 Non-Indigenous 9 (81.8) 27 (84.4) 36 (83.7)  
 Death due to IPD        
 Yes 0 (0.0) 1 (3.1) 1 (2.3)  
 No death/unknown 11 (100.0) 31 (96.9) 42 (97.7)  
 Infecting serotype        
7vPCV 11 (100.0) 7 (21.9) 18 (41.9)  
 4 0 (0.0) 1 (3.1) 1 (2.3)  
 6B 2 (18.2) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.7)  
 14 1 (9.1) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.3)  
 19F 6 (54.5) 6 (18.8) 12 (27.9)  
 23F 2 (18.2) 0 (0.0) 2 (4.7)  
13vPCV ··· ··· 25 (78.1) 25 (58.1)  
 3 ··· ··· 5 (15.6) 5 (11.6)  
 19A ··· ··· 20 (62.5) 20 (46.5)  
 Clinical category        
 Bacteraemia 6 (54.5) 9 (28.1) 15 (34.9)  
 Meningitis 0 (0.0) 1 (3.1) 1 (2.3)  
 Pneumonia 4 (36.4) 18 (56.3) 22 (51.2)  
 Other* 0 (0.0) 3 (9.4) 3 (7.0)  
 Unknown 1 (9.1) 1 (3.1) 2 (4.7)  
 *Includes septic arthritis (2) and mastoiditis (1). 7v, 7-valent; 13v, 13-valent; IPD, invasive pneumococcal 
disease; PCV, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. 
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Table 7—Line list of breakthrough invasive pneumococcal disease cases in children 
younger than 5 years of age, Queensland, 2006–2015 
 Case Year Age 
(months) 
Indigenous 
status 
Infecting 
serotype 
7vPCV 
doses 
13vPCV 
doses 
Months since 
last PCV dose 
 
 1 2006 17 Non-Indigenous 19F 3 0 10  
 2 2006 18 Non-Indigenous 19F 3 0 12  
 3 2006 11 Non-Indigenous 23F 3 0 5  
 4 2007 14 Non-Indigenous 6B 3 0 6  
 5* 2008 27 Indigenous 23F 3 0 19  
 6 2008 25 Non-Indigenous 6B 3 0 18  
 7 2008 16 Indigenous 19F 3 0 10  
 8 2009 57 Non-Indigenous 14 3 0 51  
 9 2010 56 Non-Indigenous 19F 3 0 50  
 10 2011 33 Non-Indigenous 19F 3 0 29  
 11 2011 10 Non-Indigenous 19F 3 0 4  
 12 2012 46 Non-Indigenous 19F 3 0 40  
 13 2012 23 Non-Indigenous 4 3 0 16  
 14 2013 16 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 10  
 15 2013 18 Non-Indigenous 3 0 3 12  
 16 2013 18 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 12  
 17 2013 15 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 8  
 18 2013 17 Indigenous 19A 0 3 11  
 19 2013 23 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 16  
 20 2013 22 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 16  
 21 2013 19 Non-Indigenous 19F 0 3 10  
 22 2013 21 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 14  
 23 2013 13 Indigenous 19A 0 3 6  
 24 2013 27 Non-Indigenous 3 0 3 21  
 25 2014 24 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 18  
 26 2014 15 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 9  
 27 2014 27 Non-Indigenous 3 0 3 20  
 28* 2014 25 Indigenous 3 0 3 18  
 29 2014 38 Non-Indigenous 19F 0 3 32  
 30 2015 35 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 28  
 31 2015 40 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 33  
 32 2015 17 Indigenous 3 0 3 10  
 33 2015 39 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 33  
 34 2015 18 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 12  
 35 2015 33 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 27  
 36 2015 51 Non-Indigenous 19F 2 1 45  
 37 2015 15 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 9  
 38 2015 14 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 9  
 39 2015 13 Non-Indigenous 19F 0 3 7  
 40 2015 20 Indigenous 19A 0 3 12  
 41 2015 28 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 12  
 42 2015 37 Non-Indigenous 19F 0 4 17  
 43 2015 35 Non-Indigenous 19A 0 3 29  
 *Also received 1 dose of 23-valent pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine. 7v, 7-valent; 13v, 13-valent; PCV, 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. 
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Figure 3—Months elapsed since last pneumococcal conjugate vaccine dose among 
cases of breakthrough invasive pneumococcal disease in children younger than 5 
years of age, Queensland, 2006–2015 
 
Table 8—Risk factors identified through routine surveillance for breakthrough and non-
breakthrough cases of invasive pneumococcal disease in children younger than 5 
years, Queensland, 2006–2015 
 
 
Breakthrough 
cases 
Non-breakthrough 
cases 
     
 
Risk factor 
n=43 (%) n=408 (%) χ2 p-value*  
 Any risk factor identified 24 (55.8) 117 (28.7) 13.3 <0.001  
 Childcare attendee 17 (39.5) 20 (4.9) 62.0 <0.001  
 Household exposure to cigarette smoke 4 (9.3) 42 (10.3) 2.2 0.16  
 Prematurity (<37 weeks gestation) 4 (9.3) 39 (9.6) 0.0 1.00  
 Presence of a congenital or 
chromosomal abnormality 
4 (9.3) 11 (2.7) 5.3 0.04  
 Immunocompromised 3 (7.0) 18 (4.4) 0.6 0.44  
 Presence of a chronic illness 1 (2.3) 11 (2.7) 0.0 1.00  
 *Calculated using Fisher's exact test.  
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Recurrent IPD 
From 1997 to 2015, there were 6,075 notified cases of IPD reported in 5,955 
Queensland residents. Of these, 120 (2%) were recurrent episodes that occurred 
in 102 individuals (Table 9). Among those who had disease recurrence, 87 
(85%) experienced two episodes, 13 (13%) had three episodes, one (1%) person 
experienced four episodes, and one (1%) had five episodes recorded. A total of 
5,490 (92%) individuals survived more than 14 days after their initial IPD 
episode, contributing 45,394 person-years at risk of recurrent disease.  
 
The annual rate of primary IPD during the study period was 7.8 per 100,000, 
and was lowest from 2012–2015 (5.6 per 100,000). The overall rate of recurrent 
IPD was 264.4 per 100,000 person-years, 35 times the annual incidence of 
primary IPD. The recurrence rate was highest from 2001–2004, decreasing by 
50% from 2005–2011, and subsequently increasing 36% during the 2012–2015 
period, when the recurrence rate was 50 times the annual incidence of primary 
IPD. The median time elapsed between the first and second episode was 19.8 
months (range, 27 days–12.3 years; Figure 4). Thirty-five (34%) individuals had 
their second episode within 12 months of their initial episode. For further 
recurrence (>2 episodes), the median period between episodes was 25.5 months 
(range, 55 days–4.3 years). The rate of any recurrence after a second episode of 
IPD was 3,592.7 per 100,000 person-years (95% CI, 2,263.5–5,702.3). At the 
time of the second episode, 70% of individuals had no record of pneumococcal 
vaccination. 
 
The recurrent IPD rate among Indigenous Australians (991.1 per 100,000 
person-years) was approximately four times the rate in the non-Indigenous 
population, and over 100 times the primary IPD rate. While not significant, the 
IPD recurrence rate following an initial episode of pneumococcal meningitis was 
nearly double that after a primary episode of pneumococcal bacteraemia or 
bacteraemic pneumonia. The clinical categories of recurrent episodes were 
significantly different according to the category of the initial episode (χ2, 64.6; 
p<0.001; 
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Table 10), with individuals most likely to experience a recurrent episode of the 
same category as their initial presentation. 
 
Table 9—Characteristics and rates of recurrent and primary invasive pneumococcal 
disease cases, Queensland, 1997–2015 
   Recurrent disease Primary disease  
   n=120 (%) Rate* (95% CI) n=5,955 (%) Rate†  
 Age (years)       
 <5 8 (6.7) 166.1 (83.1–332.1) 1,596 (26.8) 30.6  
 5–14 12 (10.0) 89.6 (50.9–157.8) 327 (5.5) 3.1  
 15–49 51 (42.5) 376.9 (286.4–495.9) 1,553 (26.1) 4.1  
 50–64 27 (22.5) 465.8 (319.5–679.3) 1,016 (17.1) 7.7  
 ≥65 22 (18.3) 280.5 (184.7–426.0) 1,462 (24.6) 15.3  
 Sex       
 Male 64 (53.3) 253.4 (198.3–323.7) 3,294 (55.3) 8.6  
 Female 56 (46.7) 278.4 (214.2–361.7) 2,660 (44.7) 6.9  
 Indigenous status      
 Indigenous 54 (45.0) 979.9 (750.5–1,279.4) 756 (12.7) 27.5  
 Non-Indigenous 66 (55.0) 165.5 (130.0–210.6) 5,199 (87.3) 6.9  
 Clinical category‡      
 Bacteraemia 25 (20.8) 339.98 (229.7–503.2) 989 (16.6) 1.3  
 Meningitis 9 (7.5) 670.14 (348.7–1,288.0) 222 (3.7) 0.3  
 Pneumonia 33 (27.5) 359.8 (255.8–506.1) 1,769 (29.7) 2.3  
 Other/unknown 53 (44.2) 192.5 (147.1–252.0) 2,975 (50.0) 3.9  
 Time period       
 1997–2000 4 (3.3) 268.8 (100.9–716.2) 1,103 (18.5) 8.0  
 2001–2004 27 (22.5) 409.4 (280.8–597.0) 1,772 (29.8) 12.0  
 2005–2011 44 (36.7) 206.6 (153.8–277.7) 2,033 (34.1) 6.9  
 2012–2015 45 (37.5) 280.4 (209.3–375.5) 1,047 (17.6) 5.6  
 1997–2015 120 (100.0) 264.4 (221.0–316.1) 5,955 (100.0) 7.8  
 *Per 100,000 person-years. †Per 100,000 population per year. ‡For recurrent disease, the clinical category 
represents that of the initial episode, with the number of cases and recurrence rates following an initial episode 
of the specified clinical presentation of IPD. 
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Table 10—Clinical category of initial and recurrent episodes of invasive pneumococcal 
disease, Queensland, 1997–2015 
  
 
Category of recurrent episodes   
  Category of 
initial episode 
Bacteraemia Meningitis Pneumonia Other/unknown Total   
  n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)   
  Bacteraemia 14 (56.0) 0 (0.0) 5 (20.0) 6 (24.0) 25 (100.0)   
  Meningitis 1 (11.1) 4 (44.4) 1 (11.1) 3 (33.3) 9 (100.0)   
  Pneumonia 11 (33.3) 0 (0.0) 17 (51.5) 5 (15.2) 33 (100.0)   
  Other/unknown 7 (13.2) 2 (3.8) 12 (22.6) 32 (60.4) 53 (100.0)   
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Figure 4—Months elapsed between onset of first and second episodes of invasive 
pneumococcal disease, Queensland, 1997–2015 
 
Forty-eight percent of individuals with recurrent IPD had no risk factor 
identified at the time of their initial episode (Table 11). This group experienced a 
recurrence rate of 168.0 per 100,000 person-years (95% CI, 129.6–217.9). 
Those with any risk factor identified at the time of the first episode had a 
recurrence rate of 549.1 per 100,000 person-years (95% CI, 428.9–702.8)  
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Table 11—Risk factors identified for individuals with recurrent and primary-only 
invasive pneumococcal disease, Queensland, 1997–2015 
  Recurrent disease† Primary-only disease  
 Risk factor* n=102 (%) n=5,853 (%)  
 No risk factor identified 49 (48.0) 3,391 (57.9)  
 Chronic disease 30 (29.4) 956 (16.3)  
 Current smoker 21 (20.6) 478 (8.2)  
 Excessive alcohol consumption‡ 14 (13.7) 304 (5.2)  
 Aged ≥65 years, non-Indigenous 13 (12.7) 1,402 (24.0)  
 Immunosuppression 10 (9.8) 324 (5.5)  
 Diabetes 8 (7.8) 181 (3.1)  
 Aged ≥50 years, Indigenous 6 (5.9) 147 (2.5)  
 Prematurity (<37 weeks gestation) 3 (2.9) 109 (1.9)  
 Functional or anatomical asplenia 2 (2.0) 53 (0.9)  
 *Individuals may have more than one risk factor identified. †Risk factors for individuals with recurrent disease 
identified at the time of the first episode. ‡Defined as ≥4 standard drinks/day for females and ≥6 standard 
drinks/ day for males. 
 
 
From 2012 onwards, one-third of recurrent episodes were caused by 13vPCV 
serotypes, and an additional 27% were caused by the additional serotypes 
contained in 23vPPV (Table 12). 
 
Table 12—Infecting serotypes of recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease cases by 
pneumococcal vaccine period, Queensland, 1997–2015 
 Infecting  
serotype* 
Pre-7vPCV 
(1997–2000) 
Targeted 
7vPCV 
(2001–04) 
Universal 
7vPCV 
(2005–11) 
Universal 
13vPCV 
(2012–15) 
Total  
 n=4 (%) n=27 (%) n=44 (%) n=45 (%) n=120 (%)  
 7vPCV 0 (0.0) 17 (63.0) 13 (29.5) 5 (11.1) 35 (29.2)  
 13vPCV 0 (0.0) 3 (11.1) 11 (25.0) 10 (22.2) 24 (20.0)  
 23vPPV 0 (0.0) 3 (11.1) 7 (15.9) 12 (26.7) 22 (18.3)  
 Non-VT 0 (0.0) 3 (11.1) 11 (25.0) 18 (40.0) 32 (26.7)  
 Unknown 4 (100.0) 1 (3.7) 2 (4.5) 0 (0.0) 7 (5.8)  
 *Grouped by pneumococcal vaccine composition, less those included in vaccines of lower valency. 7v, 7-valent; 
13v, 13-valent; 23v, 23-valent; PCV, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine; PPV, pneumococcal polysaccharide 
vaccine; VT, vaccine type. 
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Cox proportional hazards analyses 
Age younger than 15 years 
In cases younger than 15 years, the risk factors associated with the highest risk 
of recurrence were immunocompromising conditions (HR, 12.64; 95% CI, 4.18–
38.22) and presence of a chronic illness (HR, 9.99; 95% CI, 2.91–34.33; Table 
13). 
 
After adjustment, risk factors identified at the time of the first episode 
associated with a significantly increased risk of recurrent disease included age 
group, Indigenous status, presence of immunocompromising conditions, 
presence of a chronic illness, and prematurity (Table 14).  
 
For each covariate included in the final multivariate model, ln-ln survival plots 
and plots of Kaplan-Meier observed survival curves against Cox predicted 
curves demonstrated parallel, non-intersecting curves across strata. The final 
multivariate model also did not violate the assumption of a constant log hazard 
ratio function (p=0.42).  
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Table 13—Crude HRs for recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease by covariates at 
the time of the first episode in those younger than 15, Queensland, 1997–2015 
    
Primary 
cases 
Recurrent 
cases 
HR (95% CI) p-value 
(Wald) 
p-value 
(LRT) 
  
  Sex            
  Female 783 7 1.00 ··· 0.67   
  Male 1,099 12 1.22 (0.48–3.10) 0.67 ···   
  Age (years)            
  <5 1,559 11 1.00 ··· 0.13   
  5–14 324 8 3.62 (1.46–9.01) 0.006 ···   
  Indigenous status            
  Non-Indigenous 1,615 11 1.00 ··· 0.003   
  Indigenous 268 8 4.52 (1.82–11.25) 0.001 ···   
  Time period            
  1997–2000 503 3 1.00 ··· 0.64   
  2001–2004 726 8 1.85 (0.49–6.97) 0.36 ···   
  2005–2011 457 6 2.28 (0.57–9.12) 0.25 ···   
  2012–2015 197 2 2.31 (0.38–13.97) 0.36 ···   
  Clinical category            
  Bacteraemia 606 5 1.00 ··· 0.69   
  Meningitis 103 2 2.47 (0.48–12.71) 0.28 ···   
  Pneumonia 412 3 0.91 (0.22–3.81) 0.90 ···   
  Other/unknown 762 9 1.40 (0.47–4.19) 0.54 ···   
  Infecting serotype*            
  7vPCV 698 6 1.00 ··· 0.064   
  13vPCV 405 4 1.22 (0.34–4.32) 0.76 ···   
  23vPPV 85 1 1.54 (0.18–12.78) 0.69 ···   
  Non-VT 129 5 5.17 (1.57–16.98) 0.007 ···   
  Unknown 566 3 0.61 (0.15–2.45) 0.49 ···   
  Previous pneumococcal vaccination 
  
        
  None 1,402 13 1.00 ··· 0.41   
  Present 481 6 1.52 (0.57–4.00) 0.40 ···   
  Household exposure to cigarette smoke 
  
        
  None 1,745 17 1.00 ··· 0.582   
  Present 138 2 1.55 (0.36–6.69) 0.56 ···   
  Immunocompromising condition 
  
        
  None 1,833 15 1.00 ··· <0.001   
  Present 50 4 12.64 (4.18–38.22) <0.001 ···   
  Chronic illness 
  
        
  None 1,841 16 1.00 ··· 0.005   
  Present 42 3 9.99 (2.91–34.33) <0.001 ···   
  Prematurity (<37 weeks gestation) 
  
        
  None 1,778 16 1.00 ··· 0.10   
  Present 105 3 3.27 (0.95–11.23) 0.060 ···   
  
*Of the first disease episode, grouped by pneumococcal vaccine composition, less those included in vaccines 
of lower valency. 7v, 7-valent; 13v, 13-valent; 23v, 23-valent; HR, hazard ratio; LRT, likelihood ratio test, 
PCV, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine; PPV, pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine; VT, vaccine type.  
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Table 14—Adjusted HRs for recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease by covariates at 
the time of the first episode in those younger than 15 years, Queensland, 1997–2015 
    Primary 
cases 
Recurrent 
cases 
Adjusted HR* 
(95% CI) 
p-value 
(Wald) 
p-value 
(LRT) 
  
  Age (years)            
  <5 1,559 11 1.00 ··· 0.052   
  5–14 324 8 2.69 (1.03–7.04) 0.044 ···   
  Indigenous status            
  Non-Indigenous 1,615 11 1.00 ··· 0.012   
  Indigenous 268 8 3.58 (1.39–9.23) 0.008 ···   
  Immunocompromising condition 
 
          
  None 1,833 15 1.00 ··· 0.005   
  Present 50 4 8.40 (2.37–29.81) 0.001 ···   
  Chronic illness            
  None 1,841 16 1.00 ··· 0.069   
  Present 42 3 4.21 (1.06–16.75) 0.041 ···   
  Prematurity (<37 weeks gestation)           
  None 1,778 16 1.00 ··· 0.10   
  Present 105 3 3.28 (0.93–11.59) 0.065 ···   
  *Adjusted for variables shown in the table. HR, hazard ratio; LRT, likelihood ratio test.   
 
Aged 15 years or more 
For cases aged 15 years or more at the time of the first episode of IPD, factors 
associated with the highest risk of recurrence were previous pneumococcal 
vaccination (HR, 5.37; 95% CI, 3.21–8.97), being an Indigenous Australian (HR, 
5.04; 95% CI, 3.24–7.82), and household exposure to cigarette smoke (HR, 
4.92; 95% CI, 2.14–11.30; Table 15). Each of the 19 individuals with recurrent 
disease and previous vaccination were Indigenous Australians. 
 
Adjusted variables significantly associated with recurrent disease were being an 
Indigenous Australian, category of clinical primary IPD episode, household 
exposure to cigarette smoke, and presence of a chronic illness. Inclusion of both 
age and sex were neither significant nor resulted in a substantial (≥10%) change 
to the coefficients in the final multivariate model and were excluded (Table 16). 
 
For each covariate included in the final multivariate model, ln-ln survival plots 
and plots of Kaplan-Meier observed survival curves against Cox predicted 
curves demonstrated parallel, non-intersecting curves across strata. The final 
multivariate model also did not violate the assumption of a constant log hazard 
ratio function (p=0.74). 
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Table 15—Crude HRs for recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease by covariates at 
the time of the first episode in those aged 15 years or more, Queensland, 1997–2015 
    Primary 
cases 
Recurrent 
cases 
HR (95% CI) p-value 
(Wald) 
p-value 
(LRT) 
  
  Sex           
  Female 1,676 40 1.00 ··· 0.79   
  Male 1,930 43 0.94 (0.61–1.45) 0.79 ···   
  Age (years)           
  15–49 1,473 43 1.00 ··· 0.13   
  50–64 931 25 1.13 (0.69–1.86) 0.62 ···   
  ≥65 1,202 15 0.62 (0.34–1.11) 0.11 ···   
  Indigenous status           
  Non-Indigenous 3,164 50 1.00 ··· <0.001   
  Indigenous 442 33 5.04 (3.24–7.82) <0.001 ···   
  Time period           
  1997–2000 513 12 1.00 ··· 0.11   
  2001–2004 936 25 1.18 (0.59–2.35) 0.64 ···   
  2005–2011 1,395 30 1.17 (0.59–2.30) 0.66 ···   
  2012–2015 762 16 2.43 (1.11–5.32) 0.026 ···   
  Clinical category           
  Bacteraemia 325 16 1.00 ··· <0.001   
  Meningitis 128 4 0.54 (0.18–1.62) 0.27 ···   
  Pneumonia 1,233 25 0.35 (0.19–0.66) 0.001 ···   
  Other/unknown 1,920 38 0.25 (0.14–0.45) <0.001 ···   
  Infecting serotype*           
  7vPCV 1,040 21 1.00 ··· 0.010   
  13vPCV 902 18 1.31 (0.69–2.47) 0.41 ···   
  23vPPV 494 14 2.03 (1.03–4.02) 0.04 ···   
  Non-VT 493 17 2.86 (1.49–5.46) 0.001 ···   
  Unknown 677 13 0.93 (0.46–1.85) 0.83 ···   
  Previous pneumococcal vaccination 
 
        
  None 3,370 64 1.00 ··· <0.001   
  Present 236 19 5.37 (3.21–8.97) <0.001 ···   
  Smoking status           
  Never smoked 2,859 59 1.00 ··· 0.002   
  Ex-smoker 298 3 0.65 (0.20–2.07) 0.46 ···   
  Current smoker 449 21 2.54 (1.54–4.18) <0.001 ···   
  Household exposure to cigarette smoke 
 
        
  None 3,556 77 1.00 ··· 0.002   
  Present 50 6 4.92 (2.14–11.30) <0.001 ···   
  Functional or anatomical asplenia 
 
        
  None 3,561 81 1.00 ··· 0.23   
  Present 45 2 2.71 (0.67–11.02) 0.16 ···   
  Excessive alcohol consumption 
 
         
  None 3,328 69 1.00 ··· 0.001   
  Present 278 14 2.88 (1.62–5.12) <0.001 ···   
  Immunocompromising condition 
 
         
  None 3,356 77 1.00 ··· 0.26   
  Present 250 6 1.67 (0.72–3.84) 0.23 ···   
  Chronic illness           
  None 2,790 56 1.00 ··· <0.001   
  Present 816 27 2.56 (1.61–4.08) <0.001 ···   
  *Grouped by pneumococcal vaccine composition, less those included in vaccines of lower valency. 7v, 7-
valent; 13v, 13-valent; 23v, 23-valent; HR, hazard ratio; LRT, likelihood ratio test; PCV, pneumococcal 
conjugate vaccine; PPV, pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine; VT, vaccine-type. 
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Table 16—Adjusted HRs for recurrent invasive pneumococcal disease by covariates at 
the time of the first episode in those aged 15 years or more, Queensland, 1997–2015 
    Primary 
cases 
Recurrent 
cases 
Adjusted HR* 
(95% CI) 
p-value 
(Wald) 
p-value 
(LRT) 
  
  Indigenous status            
  Non-Indigenous 3,164 50 1.00 ··· <0.001   
  Indigenous 442 33 4.32 (2.71–6.87) <0.001 ···   
  Clinical category            
  Bacteraemia 325 16 1.00 ··· 0.015   
  Meningitis 128 4 0.67 (0.22–2.02) 0.48 ···   
  Pneumonia 1,233 25 0.34 (0.18–0.64) 0.001 ···   
  Other/unknown 1,920 38 0.53 (0.26–1.04) 0.067 ···   
  Household exposure to cigarette smoke 
 
        
  None 3,556 77 1.00 ··· 0.025   
  Present 50 6 3.12 (1.31–7.40) 0.010 ···   
  Chronic illness            
  None 2,790 56 1.00 ··· 0.008   
  Present 816 27 2.14 (1.22–3.77) 0.008 ···   
  *Adjusted for variables shown in the table. 
HR, hazard ratio; LRT, likelihood ratio test 
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Discussion 
Breakthrough IPD 
The burden of IPD in Queensland children younger than 5 years of age has 
significantly decreased following the introduction of universal infant 
vaccination with PCVs, in-line with national trends.39 However, since the 
replacement of 7vPCV with 13vPCV in the NIP, breakthrough disease has 
emerged as the major cause of preventable IPD in this age group. Additionally, 
the burden of breakthrough disease in children aged 1–4 years has surpassed 
the total burden of PCV-type disease in children younger than 12 months. 
Similar increases in breakthrough disease have not been observed in other 
countries after replacement of 7vPCV with 13vPCV that use 2+1 or 3+1 
schedules in their national immunisation programs.40-42 The factors most likely 
contributing to the increase in breakthrough IPD that we observed, including 
the vaccine, the schedule, and underlying conditions, require further 
examination. 
 
Breakthrough IPD has further increased since the introduction of 13vPCV, with 
the most likely explanation for this being reduced vaccine effectiveness against 
certain serotypes using a 3+0 schedule. The increase in breakthrough IPD has 
been primarily driven by serotypes 19A and 3, though serotype 19F also has 
been responsible for breakthrough disease after primary courses of both 7vPCV 
and 13vPCV. Vaccine effectiveness of 13vPCV in children against serotype 3 has 
been shown in general to be nonsignificant, and against serotype 19A is 
considerably lower than other 7vPCV and 13vPCV serotypes.43-46 The reduced 
serotype-specific effectiveness likely contributes in part to the persistence of 19A 
and 3 as the predominant infecting serotypes observed both in our study and 
overseas since the introduction of 13vPCV.47 In contrast, immunogenicity and 
reduction in nasopharyngeal colonisation specific to serotype 19F have been 
demonstrated to be superior after a primary course and booster dose of 13vPCV 
compared to 7vPCV.48,49 Absence of a booster dose at or after 12-months of age 
in the NIP may therefore partly explain the continued occurrence of 
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breakthrough 19F cases, despite the demonstrated effectiveness of 13vPCV 
against this serotype. 
 
The effect of vaccine scheduling on immunogenicity and carriage also influences 
the likelihood of breakthrough disease. Most studies examining the effects of 
pneumococcal vaccine scheduling on these outcomes were performed in settings 
where 7vPCV was being used. Three primary 7vPCV doses have been shown to 
produce higher proportions of children with protective antibody levels than in 
children receiving 2 primary doses by seven months of age, though these 
differences largely disappear by 12 months.17 Post-boosting antibody 
concentrations at 13 months and 19 months are significantly higher in those 
receiving a 2+1 compared to a 3+0 schedule.50 Significant differences have not 
been seen in rates of carriage between 3+0 and 2+1 schedules, though these 
have not been evaluated for 13vPCV serotypes beyond the first year of life when 
the incidence of breakthrough disease increases.19 While these comparisons are 
not necessarily generalisable to the serotype-specific immune responses 
induced by 13vPCV, they are indicative of lower long-term protection provided 
by a 3+0 schedule. Previous evidence of lower vaccine effectiveness against 
serotypes 19A and 3, combined with waning immunity beyond the first year of 
life coheres with our experience of children with breakthrough disease at a 
median age of 22 months, 14 months since their most recent PCV dose. The 
evidence for greater long-term antibody concentrations resulting from booster 
dose schedules and the timing of breakthrough disease in our study suggests 
that a 2+1 schedule may be of benefit in reducing the burden of breakthrough 
IPD in our population. 
 
Underlying immunocompromising conditions may also lead to reduced 
pneumococcal vaccine effectiveness and subsequent breakthrough disease.51 In 
our study, childcare attendance was the predominant risk factor we identified in 
children with breakthrough disease. While the proportion of breakthrough cases 
with a congenital or chromosomal abnormality was higher compared to non-
breakthrough cases, less than 10 per cent of breakthrough cases had these risk 
factors identified. One reason for this might be that children with underlying 
medical conditions are already provided a booster 13vPCV dose at 12 months, 
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conferring sufficient long-term immunity to prevent breakthrough disease 
during the high-risk period from 12 to 23 months of age. If underlying medical 
conditions were a significant contributor to the burden of breakthrough IPD, we 
would have expected a higher frequency of cases in the Australian 7vPCV era, as 
well as greater numbers of breakthrough disease reported from overseas 
countries.40 
 
An essential consideration in changing from a 3+0 to 2+1 schedule is that, by 
removing the third primary dose, the risk of PCV-type disease may, 
theoretically, increase in children from 6 months of age until receipt of the 12-
month booster dose. Serotype-specific antibody concentrations are typically 
higher after receiving 3 compared to 2 primary doses in the first year of life.17 
However, the proportion of children achieving protective antibody 
concentrations during this period are similar in both schedules.17,52 We found 
the burden of PCV-type disease in children aged 6–12 months to be small, with 
only one child experiencing an episode of IPD due to serotype 3 in this age 
group since 2012. With the herd protection achieved through high vaccination 
coverage and low case numbers in those aged 6–12 months, the risk of increased 
disease caused by changing to a 2+1 schedule is likely low. 
 
Cases of breakthrough disease in Australia (identified as pneumococcal vaccine 
failures) are reported in quarterly and annual IPD surveillance reports by the 
Enhanced Invasive Pneumococcal Disease Surveillance Working Group 
(EIPDSWG). However, no surveillance reports have summarised trends in 
pneumococcal vaccine failures following the introduction of 7vPCV and 
subsequent replacement with 13vPCV. In 2016, a total of 43 13vPCV failures 
were reported nationally in children younger than 5 years, accounting for 70% 
of the IPD burden in this age group.53-56 This is considerably higher than the 
proportion of the IPD burden due to breakthrough disease we observed from 
2012–2015 (50%), though this may be due to the difference in definitions of 
breakthrough disease used in our study and the definition of vaccine failure 
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used by EIPDSWG.† Of the 43 nationally reported cases of 13vPCV failures in 
2016, 15 (35%) were caused by each of serotypes 19A and 3, and 11 (26%) were 
caused by serotype 19F. This serotype distribution of breakthrough disease is 
similar to that in our study from 2012–2015, except for the notably higher 
proportion of national cases caused by serotype 3 (35% vs. 12%). The high 
proportion of national PCV-type disease due to vaccine failures is concerning 
and highlights this issue is persisting and not isolated to the Queensland 
population. 
 
Recurrent IPD 
We identified recurrent episodes in 2% of those experiencing a primary episode 
of IPD, similar to that reported in previous studies of recurrent invasive 
disease.1,23,25,26 However, individuals with a previous episode of IPD experience 
a substantially increased risk of future disease compared to the general 
population. Recurrence rates were higher among certain groups such as 
Indigenous Australians and those with underlying medical conditions, but also 
remain elevated in individuals with no underlying risk factors identified through 
enhanced surveillance. The elevated risk of recurrence in those without known 
risk factors is concerning, as this group is currently neglected in pneumococcal 
vaccination recommendations. Given the severity of the disease, high rates of 
recurrence, and potential for preventability, the association between previous 
IPD and future disease should be recognised and reflected in national 
immunisation guidelines. 
 
Considerations regarding the number, timing, and pneumococcal vaccine type 
to provide individuals after an episode of IPD primarily include age and 
                                            
†
 Vaccine failures used by the EIPDSWG and reported nationally include children aged 
more than 6 months of age that received 3 or more doses of a PCV and develop IPD 
due to a serotype contained within all 3 doses of the administered conjugate vaccines. 
Also included are those aged 6 months or more who receive less than 3 doses of a 
PCV due to a delayed start, missed doses, or catch-up, but the total number of doses 
is age-appropriate according to the recommendations in the Australian Immunisation 
Handbook. 
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previous pneumococcal vaccination history. The presence of underlying medical 
conditions may also influence the decision regarding type and number of doses, 
as immune responses might be suboptimal in certain groups or populations. 
Protective immune responses have been demonstrated in patients receiving 
13vPCV after an episode of S. pneumoniae CAP, suggesting that individuals with 
previous pneumococcal disease might also produce protective antibody levels to 
vaccine-specific serotypes.57 Recommendations from Spleen Australia for 
vaccination of children and adults with asplenia or hyposplenism58,59 (Box 1) 
could be applied to those with previous IPD and may guide the development of 
guidelines for vaccination in this group. Catch-up schedules for 13vPCV also 
exist for children younger than 2 years with medical conditions at increased risk 
of IPD60 that could be applied to those with an initial IPD episode in this age 
group. 
 
Box 1—Spleen Australia pneumococcal vaccine recommendations for people with 
asplenia or hyposplenism58,59 
 Age <5 years  
 13vPCV Primary course at 2, 4, 6 months of age as per NIP  
  Booster dose at 12 months of age  
 23vPPV 1 dose at 4–5 years of age  
 Age 5–18 years  
 13vPCV 1 dose if no previous doses since 12 months of age  
 23vPPV 1 dose >8 weeks post 13vPCV dose (if no previous 23vPPV)  
  Booster dose 5 years post 1st 23vPPV dose  
 Age >18 years with no previous pneumococcal vaccination  
 13vPCV 1 dose  
 23vPPV 1 dose 8 weeks post 13vPCV  
  Booster dose 5 years post 23vPPV  
 Age >18 years with previous 13vPCV  
 13vPCV 1 dose*  
 23vPPV 1 dose 8 weeks post 13vPCV  
  Booster dose 5 years post 23vPPV  
 Age >18 years with previous 23vPPV  
 13vPCV 1 dose >1 year post previous 23vPPV dose  
 23vPPV 1 dose 5 years post previous 23vPPV dose  
 *At least 8 weeks must have passed since any previous 13vPCV dose. 13v, 13-valent; 23, 23-valent; 
PCV, conjugate vaccine; PPV, pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine; NIP, National Immunisation 
Program. 
 
 
With over one-third of those with disease recurrence experiencing their second 
episode within 12 months of their initial episode of IPD, pneumococcal 
vaccination should be commenced as soon as practical after recovery from the 
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initial episode. This of particular importance in children, as a primary episode of 
IPD can signify underlying immunodeficiency.61 The majority (70%) of 
individuals had no record of any pneumococcal vaccination at the time of their 
second episode, despite over half with identifiable risk factors at the time of the 
initial episode, highlighting the need for increased coverage in this group. 
Recurrence rates were highest in the period prior to the introduction of 
universal infant vaccination with 7vPCV. The subsequent decline in the 
recurrence rates is likely to have occurred as a result of both direct and indirect 
protection among those with previous IPD. However, the reduction in 
recurrence rates was not proportionate to the declines observed in the rate of 
primary disease during the same period. The observed disproportionate decline 
in recurrence rates is likely multifactorial, and may reflect underlying factors 
placing individuals at ongoing increased risk of disease, poor vaccination 
coverage in those at risk of recurrence, or differences in environmental factors 
that increase risk of disease. Planning of pneumococcal vaccination by treating 
medical practitioners during any primary or recurrent IPD episode, while cases 
are engaged with the health system and potentially motivated by their illness, 
would likely improve uptake and timeliness of pneumococcal vaccination. The 
risk of recurrence and any changes to pneumococcal vaccination 
recommendations should be communicated with healthcare providers to 
support successful implementation of this strategy. 
 
Nearly half of all recurrent episodes occurred in Indigenous Australians, who 
experienced the highest crude rates of recurrent disease and were at 
significantly increased risk of disease after adjustment for other factors. While 
3-dose coverage at 12 months of age with 13vPCV in Indigenous children has 
been relatively high (86% Australia-wide in 2014), uptake of the recommended 
12-to-18-month 13vPCV booster dose appears to have been considerably lower 
(67% Australia-wide in 2014, assessed at 30 months of age).10 Vaccination 
coverage with 23vPPV in Indigenous adults is not routinely reported, though 
previous estimates of coverage in the Northern Territory demonstrated 
relatively low uptake with considerable regional variation (24–64%).62 
Increased uptake of the childhood booster dose and adult 23vPPV dose would 
likely lead to a decrease in both primary and recurrent IPD in the Indigenous 
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population. A targeted catch-up program for Indigenous children and adults 
with previous IPD would likely assist in reducing the disproportionately high 
risk of recurrence experienced in the Indigenous population.  
 
An initial episode of pneumococcal meningitis was associated with a lower 
(though not statistically significant) risk of recurrence in those aged 15 years or 
more when compared to an initial episode of bacteraemia. The opposite effect 
was observed in children and adolescents younger than 15 years of age, though 
this was also not statistically significant. However, an initial episode of invasive 
pneumococcal pneumonia was associated with a decreased risk (-65%) of 
recurrence compared with bacteraemia, in individuals aged 15 years or more, 
which remained significant after adjustment. The significance of this finding is 
unclear, and may be due to misclassification of clinical categories or residual 
confounding in our model. Despite the lower associated recurrence risk after an 
initial episode of IPD pneumonia, the crude rate in this group was still 
substantially elevated (360 per 100,000 person-years). Given this, our findings 
do not suggest that the clinical presentation of the initial IPD episode should 
influence the decision of who should receive pneumococcal vaccines. Future 
studies of IPD recurrence might elucidate this relationship further if sufficiently 
powered. Although univariate analysis results demonstrated previous 
pneumococcal vaccination was associated with a significant increase in risk of 
recurrence in those aged 15 years or more, these recurrent cases all occurred in 
Indigenous Australians, and previous vaccination was found to be non-
significant during multivariate modelling. 
 
From 2012 to 2015, 60% of recurrent cases were potentially preventable 
through use of 13vPCV (33%) or 23vPPV (27%). This was a decrease from the 
70% of recurrent cases caused by the same serotypes from 2005 to 2011. 
Changes in vaccine preventability of recurrent cases therefore need to be 
monitored due to ongoing pneumococcal serotype replacement. Serotype 
distribution data are required to inform vaccine recommendations to prevent 
recurrent disease, as we are likely to see continued decreased incidence of 
13vPCV serotypes and the potential for increased numbers of cases due to the 
extra serotypes contained in 23vPPV.  
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While our study has identified an increased risk of recurrent IPD in certain 
groups, there are inherent limitations in using notification data for this type of 
analysis. Firstly, there is potential for misclassification of primary cases of IPD 
in individuals who had IPD prior to the study period, interstate, or overseas, or 
an individual with primary IPD in our study may have subsequently experienced 
a recurrent episode out of state. This type of misclassification would lead to an 
underestimate of recurrent case count and rate, leading to our estimate 
representing a minimum estimate of the true value. Secondly, individuals in our 
study who died outside of Queensland would not be identified, and continue to 
contribute person-years at risk of disease. Again, an error of this nature would 
lead to our estimate being a minimum estimate of the recurrence rate. Thirdly, 
completeness of notification data and differences in reporting of risk factors for 
children and adults is a source of potential misclassification. Data completeness 
might have contributed to our finding that only half of those with recurrent 
disease had any risk factor identified, considerably lower than reported 
elsewhere.1,25,28,29 While lack of risk factor completeness could affect the 
estimated crude rates and proportional hazards analyses for certain variables, it 
would not change the primary outcome of disease recurrence. Lastly, estimates 
of pneumococcal vaccination coverage may be an underestimate, particularly in 
the adult population. Transitioning to the Australian Immunisation Register, 
which will include immunisation data for all ages, should improve the accuracy 
of future studies in estimating vaccination coverage in the adult population. 
 
Conclusions 
In response to the high numbers of nationally reported vaccine failures, ATAGI 
has recently proposed changing to a 2+1 13vPCV schedule.63 Our experience of 
breakthrough disease in Queensland supports this proposed change, with the 
likely benefits of providing a booster dose to outweigh any potential harm from 
the reduced number of primary course doses. However, one group neglected in 
the proposed schedule change are those aged 1–4 years who have received a 3+0 
course, and are therefore at ongoing risk of breakthrough disease. A targeted 
catch-up campaign with one 13vPCV booster dose for children in the second 
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year of life would mitigate those likely to be at highest risk for future 
breakthrough disease. Ongoing monitoring of breakthrough disease and 
serotype distribution will be necessary to evaluate the impact of any schedule 
change. 
 
The absence of previous IPD as an identified at-risk group in national 
immunisation guidelines likely contributes to the low vaccination coverage and 
the persistently elevated rates of recurrent disease. With a majority of recurrent 
cases potentially vaccine-preventable based on infecting serotypes, we 
recommend that global immunisation guidelines specifically identify any 
episode of prior IPD as requiring pneumococcal vaccination. 
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(This page is not intended to communicate anything noteworthy) 
  
Lessons from the field and additional 
teaching activities 
V 
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Lessons from the field 
Background 
One of the core MAE requirements is teaching and participating in Lessons 
from the Field (LFF) activities. One of the skills I developed as part of my 
invasive pneumococcal disease project (Chapter IV) was working with data that 
has multiple records per subject in Stata. I decided this was a valuable skill to 
share with others and would be the focus of my LFF. 
 
Lessons learned 
The most challenging aspect of preparing the LFF was, given a wide range of 
backgrounds and skills, ensuring the exercise was valuable to each of the 
participants. I have a greater appreciation for the difficulty involved with this 
aspect of the teaching process, and have also been able to reflect further on 
suitable teaching strategies to achieve this outcome. 
 
Additional teaching activities 
Background 
I was involved in additional teaching experiences during the time of my MAE 
placement, which included: 
• participating in teaching one of the sessions during POPH8916 Outbreak 
Investigation subject for first-year MAE scholars. 
• coordinating a teaching session titled “Epi Cranium” for first-year MAE 
scholars with fellow-MAE scholar, Rose Wright, that focused on building 
trust and rapport within the first-year cohort. 
• training local staff in data collection and data entry processes during as part 
of my WHO consultancy in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Chapter V). 
• responding to ad hoc requests from fellow-MAE scholars for assistance and 
teaching with Stata commands. 
• teaching fellow public health medicine trainees epidemiological concepts in 
preparation for the Australasian Faculty of Public Health Medicine final oral 
examination. 
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Lessons learned 
The range of teaching experiences and audiences has been valuable in my 
development as an educator. Developing teaching materials has also caused me 
to reflect further on my own learning style and process. While I would often 
choose to approach teaching in a way that suits my personal learning style, I 
now give further thought to accommodating other learning styles and how the 
overall learning objectives might be met through various approaches to 
teaching. 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY IN QUEENSLAND 
162 
Appendix A—Lessons from the Field 
Lessons from the Field 
Tips and tricks for working with multiple records per 
subject in Stata 
Background 
This lesson from the field (LFF) has been developed to assist other MAE 
scholars in working with datasets with multiple records per subject. The content 
of the LFF is based off my experience in working with datasets during my MAE 
placement as well as from previous experience in data management and 
analysis.  
 
Learning objectives 
Upon completion of the exercise, you should be able to: 
• Discuss and recognise common issues that arise when working with 
datasets that have multiple records per subject 
• Clean and prepare a dataset with multiple records per subject for 
analysis using the _n and _N functions, and the egen command with seq 
option in Stata 
• Use scalars to store and recall relevant information from previous 
commands 
Please complete tasks and questions related to the dataset and submit your 
responses and annotated .do file to Malo University (jonathanmalo@gmail.com) 
by 12:01 pm (i.e. noon) on Monday 21 November.  
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Introduction to datasets with multiple records per subject 
Datasets will often have multiple records (observations) per subject to describe 
discrete events, for instance, multiple admissions to hospital, multiple 
notifications, multiple records in a trauma registry, or multiple laboratory tests. 
This type of data is often referred to as ‘record-level data’ (as opposed to 
‘person-level data’ where there is only one observation per person).  
A sample of data with multiple records per subject is provided below: 
 
In the above example, we can see that there are 5 records for person id 1, 2 
records for person id 2, and 3 records for person id 3. While small samples are 
easy to inspect visually, we don’t have this luxury when dealing with larger 
datasets. 
Some common questions to consider regarding cleaning and preparing record-
level datasets for analysis: 
• Are demographics or risk factors that don’t change with time consistently 
coded across all observations within an individual (e.g. sex, date of birth, 
Indigenous status)? If they aren’t consistently coded, what do you do with 
those observations (e.g. consider them erroneous and drop them)? 
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• How do you treat missing data for some fields (particularly risk factors) 
where they have been completed for previous observations in the same 
individual (e.g. presence of cardiac disease, smoking status)?  
• Do all the date variables make sense (e.g. hospitalisation record after 
date of death, years between disease onset date and notification date)? 
• What type of analysis are you going to perform on the data (e.g. survival 
analysis, descriptive)? We won’t go into this much but is important to 
think about what you want your cleaned dataset to look like. 
  
Preliminary Task 1. Can you think of any other issues that you might 
encounter, or have already encountered when using datasets with multiple 
records per subject? 
 
 
 
 
 
Useful commands and functions when working with multiple records per 
subject 
Thankfully, Stata has some useful ways to work with multiple record subject 
data so that we can work across observations to clean and prepare data for 
analysis. Brief explanations are provided for how these commands may be 
used, as well as hyperlinks to more extensive resources that I have found 
helpful. 
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codebook: Running the codebook command with the unique person identifier in 
your dataset is a quick way to check if there are multiple records per subject as 
the number of unique values are given, which can be compared to the total 
number of observations in the dataset. An example of the Stata output after 
running the codebook command on a unique person identifier variable is 
provided below: 
 
In the above example, we can see that the number of unique values for the 
unique person identifier variable PERSON_ID (=2,120) is less than the total 
number of observations in the dataset (=2,143). With no missing values, we can 
deduce that there are multiple records per subject in the dataset. 
duplicates: It’s important to check that multiple observations of the same event 
have not been recorded for an individual. With the duplicates command, we can 
check for exact duplicates, or partial duplicates using unique person identifiers 
combined with other variables such as dates and notification IDs. Below is an 
example of how we can use the duplicates command. 
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Below are examples of the Stata output after the duplicates report command 
and duplicates list: 
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Counting with _n and _N functions: 
Frequently, we need to access information for an individual from an earlier or 
later observation. This often occurs when looking at time between observations 
or risk factors that have been recorded in previous observations. Using _n and 
_N functions with the gen command allow us to do this. _n refers to an 
observation within the dataset, and can be specified for within a person (or 
other variable), and _N refers to the last observation in a dataset, and can be 
specified for within a person (or other variable). When using _n, you can specify 
observations before (e.g. _n-1) or after (e.g. _n+1) the observation where the 
variable is being created. An example is provided below for using _n to 
calculate time between observations: 
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The above command would transform the data as we see here: 
 
In the above example, we generate a new variable, ‘recurrence_time’, equal to 
the number of days between the preceding onset date and the onset date of the 
observation where the command is running, within each set of observations for 
a unique value of PERSON_ID. Stata will run through this command through 
the whole dataset. There is a missing value for the first observation of each 
individual, because there is no preceding observation within that individual to 
make a calculation. If we were interested in creating a variable based on the 
time until the next onset date (instead of from the previous), we would have 
specified [_n+1] in the command. 
Combining the sort command with _n functions can be very useful when 
creating new variables that take on the same value for every observation within 
an individual (e.g. date of death, presence of a particular condition, flagging 
individuals for discrepancies with their observations etc.). Sorting a dataset by 
unique person identifier and a flagging variable (where flagged observations =1 
and non-flagged observations are missing), arranges the dataset so you can 
‘carry’ the value in the flagged variable to the other missing observations within 
an individual. An example is provided below where we have created a variable, 
deathflag, that is equal to 1 where an individual has a death recorded in an 
observation (date of death not missing), and we want to carry that value of 1 to 
all other observations within that individual. : 
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The above command would perform the following transformations to the 
dataset: 
 
In the above example, because missing values in Stata take on a value of 
infinity and the sort command arranges observations in ascending order, 
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observations are then arranged according to PERSON_ID, with the observation 
with deathflag==1 at the top. All other observations with the same unique value 
for PERSON_ID will then take on the same value for deathflag. If an individual 
hasn’t died and all of their observations for deathflag are missing, the values will 
all remain missing. 
 
Preliminary Task 2. Imagine you are given a hospital record dataset (with 
multiple records per subject) that contains variables for a unique identifier 
(HOSPITAL_ID), discharge date (DISCHARGE_DATE), and admission date 
(ADMIT_DATE).  
a) You want to create a variable (dis_to_admit) that is the time between the 
most recent discharge to the subsequent admission. Write the Stata code you 
would use to do this.  
 
 
b) How would you interpret a value of <0 for dis_to_admit?  
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The _N function can be used to represent the highest count or last observation, 
either in the dataset or according to a defined group. This can be useful when 
we are interested in the total number of observations within an individual, or 
values from variables in their last observation. Two examples are provided 
below: 
 
The above command would perform the following transformation of our dataset: 
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In the above examples, we see how we can use the _N function on its own to 
generate a variable for each observation within an individual that contains the 
total number of observations for that individual in a dataset. 
In the example below, we use the _N function to specify a value from the last 
observation within an individual in our dataset: 
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The above command would perform the following transformation to our dataset: 
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egen with seq(): It is often useful to number the observations within an 
individual according to an order (often by date). We can do this using the egen 
command (a fancy version of the gen command to create new variables), or 
with the _n function. An example of how to do this is provided below: 
 
The command above would perform the following transformation to our dataset: 
 
In the above example, it is important to first order the dataset according to how 
we want the observations to be sequenced. If we did not specify to order 
according to ONSET_DATE after PERSON_ID, the egen command would have 
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sequenced the observations according to the order (or lack of) that already 
existed. Note that we could achieve the same result using the _n function and 
using the command below: 
 
The egen with seq() command has more options that allows you to customise 
the sequence further. 
Scalars (this is a bonus and useful for not just record-level data) 
After running certain commands in Stata, values are temporarily stored as 
‘scalars’ until the next command is run. The scalars that are temporarily stored 
vary according to the preceding command. These values can be recalled using 
the return list command (sometimes it is ereturn list, or sreturn list, depending 
on the preceding command. More information is in the hyperlink).’ Scalars can 
also be defined manually if you have an external value you would like to store 
and use repeatedly (e.g. population size). 
An example of using scalars after the sum command is provided below: 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY IN QUEENSLAND 
176 
 
In the above example, the listed scalars are available to include in subsequent 
commands, or can be stored permanently for later use. Below is an example of 
how these scalars can be stored and used: 
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The above example is a simple way that scalars can be utilised. They may also 
be incorporated into foreach loops and in immediate commands (e.g. cci, csi, 
iri), but those are beyond the scope of this LFF. If you want some more 
information about using scalars in these instances, please contact Malo 
University directly for private instruction. 
 
What’s the time? Data time! 
Your supervisor has noted there seem to be an increasing number of individuals 
who are having multiple notifications for disease X (a communicable disease) in 
your region. He wants to know more about those who are having multiple 
episodes, and if there are any important differences between those who are 
having multiple episodes compared to those who are only experiencing a single 
episode of disease. You’ve been provided with a dataset for confirmed 
notifications for disease X, and been asked to clean and prepare the dataset for 
analysis. 
Open the dataset malo_university.dta in Stata and start a .do file that you will 
aggressively annotate and return to Malo University. Open the provided data 
dictionary to familiarise yourself with the dataset. 
Questions: 
Q1. How many observations are there in the initial dataset? 
Q2. How many unique values are there for the unique person identifier variable, 
PERSON_ID? 
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Q3. Are there any exact duplicates in the dataset? If so, drop them like they are 
hot. Now how many observations and unique values of PERSON_ID exist in the 
dataset?  
Q4. Are there any nonsensical, non-exact duplicates with the same 
PERSON_ID? What variables would be reasonable to combine with 
PERSON_ID in the duplicates command to flag observations that might be 
faulty? Drop any observations that you feel shouldn’t be included, recording the 
relevant identifying information for the observation (PERSON_ID & NOTIF_ID) 
and any assumptions you are making.  
Q5. Are there any dates that don’t make sense, either within the same 
observation or same set of observations for an individual? Drop any 
observations that you feel shouldn’t be included, recording the relevant 
information and any assumptions you are making. (Hint: a) people having 
disease after they die? b) different DOB in the same individual? (c) get cordial 
with _n). How many observations are now in the dataset? 
Q6. How many individuals in the dataset have had more than one episode? 
What is the maximum number of episodes for one individual? (Hint: egen with 
seq() is your BFF) 
Q7. For those with more than one episode, what is the median time and 
interquartile range (in years) between episodes? (Hint: _n. Bonus marks if you 
use scalars) 
Q8. For those with multiple records, are there any changes to demographics or 
risk factors over time? For Indigenous status, let’s consider that if an individual 
is identified as Indigenous in any of their records, they are in fact Indigenous. 
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For diabetes and cardiac disease, let’s assume that after they have been 
recorded as present for an individual, they remain present for any subsequent 
records. (Hint: create new demographic/risk factor variables and make use of 
_n). How many records required changing for each of these variables? 
 
Extension questions (not compulsory): 
Q9. What proportion of all notifications are repeat notifications? 
Q10. What proportion of individuals who have one episode, will go on to have 
another episode?  
Q11. Is there a significant difference between the mean age of those with 
multiple episodes (at the time of their first episode) compared with those who 
only experienced a single episode? Report the means and the results of the 
statistical test you used. 
Q12. Compared to those who only have a single episode of disease X, is there 
a significant difference between the proportions of those who experienced 
multiple episodes that identify as Indigenous? State any assumptions you are 
making. 
Q13. What proportion of those with multiple episodes are ever-smokers (have 
been recorded as either a current smoker or ex-smoker in any observation)? 
Compared to those with only one episode? 
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Rheumatic heart disease as a notifiable condition 
Background 
Rheumatic heart disease (RHD) is a preventable condition that 
disproportionately affects Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and is 
caused by repeated episodes of acute rheumatic fever (ARF). While ARF is a 
notifiable condition in Queensland, RHD is not notifiable. RHD has recently 
been legislated as a notifiable condition for all people of all ages in Western 
Australia, South Australia, and in New South Wales for people younger than 35 
years. 
 
The Queensland RHD Register and Control Program (the Register) is funded by 
both State and Commonwealth governments. One of the functions of the 
Register is to provide a data repository for the monitoring, reporting, and 
detection of ARF and RHD. Feedback from the Register manager identified that 
a legislative requirement for health practitioners to notify cases of RHD could 
potentially lead to improved case detection, management, and monitoring. A 
decision was therefore made to scope an assessment process for the inclusion of 
RHD as a notifiable condition in Queensland. 
 
Project role 
I developed a project proposal outlining the assessment and subsequent 
legislative processes, adopting the Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
notifiable assessment criteria used to assess conditions for inclusion in the 
National Notifiable Diseases List, as a guide. The Register manager identified 
suitable stakeholders and experts to participate in a notifiable status assessment 
(NSA) panel. I assisted my supervisor in communicating with NSA panel 
members and organising a teleconference to score RHD against the notifiable 
assessment criteria. I also communicated with relevant stakeholder groups to 
invite feedback regarding the potential impact of making RHD notifiable on 
their work or practice. Following the NSA panel teleconference, I wrote a report 
summarising the results of the assessment process and stakeholder feedback to 
provide to the Executive Director, Communicable Diseases Branch. 
VI: SUMMARY OF OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH ACTIVIES AND EXPERIENCES 
183 
 
Lessons learned 
This project provided me with valuable experience in the assessment process for 
deciding whether a communicable disease should be made notifiable, as well as 
the corresponding stakeholder engagement and legislative processes. 
 
Lookback investigation of a dental clinic 
Background 
In December 2016, the Queensland Chief Health Officer issued an order under 
the Public Health Act 2005 for a dental clinic to suspend practice due to 
concerns over sterilisation procedures. 
 
The Queensland Government health advice phone service (13 HEALTH) 
contacted dental clinic patients, advising them to attend their usual medical 
practitioner and request testing for blood-borne viruses (BBVs). A testing clinic 
was also temporarily established at a local tertiary hospital for dental clinic 
patients. The subsequent lookback investigation focused on determining the 
likelihood of patients acquiring BBVs as a result of their visit to the dental clinic. 
 
Project role 
During the initial stage of the investigation, I was a member of the incident 
working group. To identify patients who were diagnosed with a BBV after their 
dental visit, I performed initial data linkage of dental patients attending the 
practice over a three-year-period with all notified cases of hepatitis C, hepatitis 
B, and HIV in Queensland. 
 
Public health units performed follow-up of cases notified with a BBV after a 
dental visit to gather information related to risk factors for acquisition. I was a 
member of the Expert Advisory Group to attribute the likelihood of cases having 
acquired their infection at the dental clinic. 
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Lessons learned 
I was able to gain an in-depth understanding of lookback investigation 
processes and the importance of balancing the likely public health benefits and 
resources required for these types of activities. 
 
WHO Western Pacific Regional Office Consultancy 
Background 
Mass screening for tuberculosis (TB) is recommended by the World Health 
Organization in populations where the TB prevalence is greater than 1%. A 
partnership project between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), World Health Organization Western Pacific Regional Office (WPRO), 
and local Ministry of Health was established to undertake mass screening for TB 
and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) on the island of Ebeye, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands. 
 
Project role 
I undertook a consultancy with the Stop TB and Leprosy Unit of WPRO to train 
local Marshallese workers in data entry and establish measures to improve and 
check data quality. I made two separate visits to Ebeye, one during the 
establishment and piloting of the screening project, and the second during the 
final week of the project. During the initial visit, I assisted in refining the 
screening questionnaire and identifying issues with data quality. In between 
visits, I conducted weekly data quality checks and raised any potential issues 
with the project team on Ebeye. In the second visit, I conducted further data 
quality checks and audited paper questionnaires against the electronic dataset. 
 
Lessons learned 
This project provided me with valuable experience working both cross-culturally 
and with other organisations. I also was able to further develop my skills in data 
management and data quality assurance activities. I am hopeful this experience 
will be of assistance in any future work I undertake in developing countries. 
